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Note by the secretariat 
At its sixth session, held at Bogota in 1955, the Economic Commission 
for Latin America adopted resolution 99 (VI) on energy and water resources 
in which it recommendedj inter alia: 
That Governments should "bear in mind the advisability of creating and 
improving ... institutions responsible for the formulation of policy in this 
sphere and also organizations responsible for compiling information and 
statistics and for evaluating the potential . w a t e r ... resources and 
their final utilization"; 
That the secretariat should "carry out a preliminary examination of 
water resources in Latin America, and of their present and future 
utilization in sc far as possible for multiple purposes"... 
Pursuant to the last recommendation, the secretariat set up, jointly 
with the Technical Assistance Administration and World Meteorological 
Organization, a Working Group to carry out the necessary studies. 
As part of the general background information for more specific studies 
in Latin America, Mr. Guillermo J. Cano, the legal and administrative expert 
of the Group, was requested to prepare a study on systems of administrative 
organization for the development of river basins. It is thought that member 
Governments will be directly interested in such a study which is a 
compilation of the experience acquired in this field in all parts of the 
world. 
The following text is not final. The author assumes sole responsibility 






1. Governmental levels at which the problem of agencies responsible 
for the development of water resources arises. 
Purpose of the Study 
The most suitable types of administrative organization for the 
development of water resources fall into five categories: (a) international; 
(b) national (covering an entire country); (c) regional (covering part of a 
country, usually a river basin); (d) local (a province, State or any other 
major political sub-division of a country); and (e) municipal. 
(a) With respect to the interna.tional level, i.e., the administration 
of development programmes for international river basins, a preliminary 
study has been made in a recent United Nations document.^ Prior to this, 
2/ 
the International Labour Organisation also considered the subject,So far 
the only organizations to be set up in Latin America, are those for research 
or programming which are listed in a publication by the Interamerican Bar 
Association,^ but none has executive functions as yet. The Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are 
concerned with the international organisations dealing with the problem of 
water pollution in international river basins.^ ECE has also done 
constructive work in promoting the establishment of organizations for 
y Integrated river basin development ( 5 / 3 0 6 6 ) , P . 3 5 (paras. 26-38) and 
p. 39 (paras. 6-9). 
2[ Herman Finer, The TVA: Lessons for international application, Montreal, 
1944, para. 140. 
3/ Guillermo J. Cano, The juridical status of international (non-maritime) 
waters in the Western Hemisphere, Interamerican Bar Association, Washington 
1938 (United States Library of Congress, catalogue card #58-12112), pp. 99 
et seq. 
/¡/ WHO, Administrative aspects of water pollution control. Preparatory paper 
N° 1, Fourth Inter-Agency Meeting of Water Resources, Geneva, 1957; ECE, 
Problems concerning water pollution abatement in Europe, note for the 
same meeting; A study on water pollution control problems in Europe 
(E/ECE/311), pp. 56-71, and Water pollution control problems in Europe 
(i/ECE/312), paras. 6-7. ~ 
/ international trade 
V-
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international trade in hydroelectric energy.-^  These two aspects - water 
pollution and the international utilization of energy - are only individual 
uses or aspects and do not by any means constitute the. whole problem of 
integrated water resources development. In both cases/ however, 
administrative organization is one of their most important aspects. 
(b) With regard to the national or country level, the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) has completed studies of water resources 
in Chile and Ecuador, Both documents include a chapter on the national 
aspect of the question. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) has published some information papers on the countries in its sphere 
U 
of action.™ The Secretary-General of the United Nations has repeatedly 
emphasized the need for water development commissions or boards to be 
organized in each country on a ñátxonal basis, and has formulated 
recommendations in this respect.-^ 
(c) The regional level (mainly by river basins) will be dealt with in 
this report.-^ An attempt has been made to give an objective and systematic 
description of the main organizations of this kind in the world in order to 
guide and inform Latin American Governments and persons interested in these 
problems. Similar agencies operating in Latin America will also be reviewed. 
5/ Prospects of exporting electric power from Yugoslavia (E/ECE/192); 
Intemational action for the development of Austrian hydro.resources with 
3, view to power exports (ECE/EP/63); International action to install a 
pumping station in Luxembourg (ECE]/ EP/ 64/ Rev. lj! 
6/ Proceedings of the Regional Technical Conference on Water Resources 
Development in Asia and the Far East, Flood Control Series N° 9, United 
Nations publication, Sales N°: 1956.11. P.3, Bangkok 195¿7~and N° 11, 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 1956.II.F.8, Bangkok, 1956. 
7/ E/2603 and Corr.l, paras. 43-46 and 59; E/2327, paras. 21-23. 
8/ This aspect has also been dealt with in document E/3066, p. 10 (paras. 9 




(d) and (e) Problems at the local and municipal level have been discussed o/ in a FAO publication-* though in relation to only one aspect: the use of 
water for irrigation - as well as in an ECLA study on water resources in 
Ecuador. A report prepared by the United Nations Technical Assistance 
Administration examines the relationships between the national and local 
levels in Argentina.^ 
2. The administrative, organization of regional water development 
Programmes (mainly with respect to river basing). 
Nature of the problem. 
This is not a legal problem but one of "administrative science". The 
municipalities have the widest experience in regional administration and are 
11/ considered by one author to be multi-purpose regional bodies.-^ This may 
indeed be the case, but since by definition they deal with urban problems only 
i 
and those now being studied cover a much larger territory, they should be left 
aside. Moreover, the common denominator of the technical problems whereby an 
area is defined.territorially as a "region" and considered in this sense here, 
is the river valley or basin, with all its inherent or related natural 
resources. 
The problem becomes more complicated in countries that are politically 
organized as federations, when the agency responsible for carrying out a 
regional development programme has to act in a zone that comprises several 
12/ 
political jurisdictions (provinces or States).-^ This is not true of all 
federal couhtries, but only of those in which jurisdiction over water 
resources is divided among the different government levels. Mexico, Brazil 
and Venezuela, for instance, do not follow this procedure because their 
respective federal Governments have exclusive jurisdiction over virtually 
all the waters in question, 
9/ Guillermo J. Cano, Las leyes de aguas en Sudamérica, Cuaderno de Fomento 
Agropecuario, N° 56, FAO^ Rome, 1956. 
10/ Advisory Commission on Hydro-electric Planning (Concision Asesora de 
Planificación Hidroeléctrica), Una solución nacional. Agua, electricidad, 
economía, Buenos Aires, 1958* pp. 92 and 106. 
11/ Finer, op. cit., p. 126. 
12/ Ernest A. Engelbert, "Federalism and water resources development", Law 
and contemporary problems - water resources, Duke University School of 
Law, Durham, North Carolina, 1957, summer issue. 
/There is 
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There is no need to enlarge any further in this document on what cons-
titutes an integrated development policy for a river basin. This has been 
dealt with in a comprehensive report recently published by a United Nations 
panel of experts, which stresses the importance of choosing the right type 
of organization for carrying out a policy of this kind.^ It will suffice 
to state very briefly that such a policy is based on the concept that all 
natural resources - water, forests, land, mines, fauna, air, flora - are 
interdependent, and.that water, or rather water resources, including snow 
and clouds, underground and surface waters, etc. can have multiple uses,—^ 
and may also be harmful in several ways.-*^ Hence, if the maximum social 
and individual benefit is to be obtained from these multiple uses and 
effects, they must be co-ordinated arid integrated with those of other 
natural and human resources in the basin. During their early stages of 
their development, communities have always used water for separate and 
unconnected purposes. But when the growth of the population and its 
increasing demand for food, clothing and manufactured goods, made it 
imperative to use these resources as intensively and efficiently as possible, 
the concept of their multiple, co-ordinated and integrated use emerged, by 
virtue of which every use becomes more economic. 
The interdependence of natural resources should be emphasized precisely 
because it is the justification for their integrated or joint administration. 
.If land or forests are used inadequately, waterways silt up and floods are 
more disastrous. The excessive use of water leads to erosion. Mines cannot 
usually be exploited without an abundant supnly of water for consumption arid 
for generating electric energy and often have to be drained before work can 
begin. The use of water affects fish, which are often an important item in 
the human diet. The organization of an agency to carry out an integrated 
river basin development programme is therefore not merely a problem of civil 
13/ E/3066, op. cit., PP. 46, 79 and 86. , 
14/ Population supplies, irrigation, electricity, driving power, industrial 
uses, recreation and touring, transport, medicinal uses and fisheries. 
15/ Floods, pollution, saline impregnation, undermining of land, erosion, 
harmful effects on human and animal health. 
/ engineering,. 
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engineering, consisting in the projection of water works, the excavation of 
canals or the construction of electric lines. On the contrary, it involves 
a number of highly complex problems which should be envisaged in advance, 
as, for instance, the population growth which would result from such a 
Programme, the town-planning and education oroblems creating capital 
requirements, the lack of trained technical personnel, which is usually 
acute in under-develóled areas, the need for more roads and railways to 
transport production, market problems, etc.. Hence, it would be useful to 
take advantage of the valuable experience acquired by countries which are 
already familiar with these Problems, while avoiding the mistake of 
restricting the activities of the authorities responsible for carrying out 
programmer of this kind to a few aspects only, to the exclusion of all others 
i A/ or, at least, to the detriment of a co-ordinated approach.^ 
There are many valuable sources of information on this type of 
organization in the world, and countries which are anxious to begin develop-
ment programmes should make use of past exoerience in order to avoid the 
17/ 
same errors.—" 
The earliest experience acquired in this field dates back to 1Ó02, when 
the Netherlands Government founded the East Indies and West Indies 
Companies.-^ These companies were originally created for a single purpose 
(in contrast to multi-purpose organizations), but, even so, their experience 
is useful as regards administrative decentralization, i.e., the adoption, of 
new types of organization which depart from the classic concent of public 
administration. The idea of multi-purpose regional agencies is of recent 
origin, dating back only thirty years. 
16/ Stefan Robock, Regional aspects of economic development: with special 
reference to recent experience in Northeast Brazil (submitted to the 
Regional Science Association), criticizes the lack of co-ordination among 
the various offices responsible for regional development, with reference 
to the north-east of Brazil. 
17/ Harry A. Steele and Mark M. Regan, "Organization and administrative 
arrangements for an effective water policy", Journal of Farm Economics, 
Vol. XXXVII, N° 5, December 1955, P. 892. This deals with the mutual 
influence of water policy and of the type of administrative organization 
chosen to carry it out. 
Waldemar Ferreyra, "A Companhia Geral t>ara o Estado do Brasil", Revista 
da Facultade de Direito, Vol. I, Sao Paulo, 1959, P. 73. 
/3. World 
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3• World experience .in this field 
The annex to this study enumerates the principal regional organizations 
of the world which are concerned with the utilization of water resources, 
and contains a bibliography and some l?rief comments on the objectives and 
powers of those organizations. Not all deal with water resources onl£, but 
in every case it is at least one of their functions. 
This compilation is intended to supply interested Governments and 
Persons with as much information as possible on the criteria that have been 
adopted in dealing with these nroblems in different parts of the world, 
including Latin America, in order to help them to benefit from Past 
experience. 
As one of the main aspects of the problem is the relationship between 
different Government levels in the same country where the disparity between 
their Powers can be observed more clearly, the list of organizations has been 
divided into two parts; the first comprises interjurisdictional agencies, 
which are organized by more than one political or administrative authority, 
and the second, those which are governed by one authority only. In the 
special case of the United States,, which has a great number of agencies of 
this kind, the classification has been arranged by purposes, This country 
appears in both parts of the list, since it has organizations in the two 
categories» 
The two categories contain 39.agencies in all, which is indicative of 





TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION SUITABLE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
BASED ON THE UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
Table 1 outlines the different methods which might be adopted to 
organize the administration of regional development programmes based on 
the utilization of water resources and also indicates the way in which the 
subject has been dealt with in the present chapter. 
Table 1 
TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION SUITABLE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
• BASED ON THE UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
1» Ordinary ministerial (or departmental) organization 
(a) Independent action by the different offices 
(b) • lixter-office (inter-ministerial) agreements 
2« Decentralized organization (autonomous bodies) 
(a) Offices with functional jurisdiction 
(i) Ordinary áutonomous bodies 
(ii) State enterprises 
(b) Offices with territorial-functional jurisdiction 
(i) Public corporations (autonomous regional bodies) 
(ii) "Districts» 
3 o State companies 
(a) Among official bodies 
(b) Between one official body and private persons (joint company) 
(c) Among several official bodies and private persons or companies 
(j oint c ompany ) 
(d) Private persons only, but with governmental powers 
4. The use of public establishments or works through contracts with 
private companies. 
It has been wisely asserted that this subject cannot be made to conform 
to cut-and-dried formulae,that stress should not be laid on the number of 
1/ Finer, op, cit., p, 113 /agencies but 
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agencies but on the tenor of their statutes,-' and that what matters in 
the last issue is the ability of those responsible for administering such, 
agencies o 
No country has the same geographical and physical features as another 
or has reached the same stage of economic development. In addition, each 
has a different historical background which has formed its institutional 
structure and organizational habits and given rise to traditions which it 
is sometimes neither feasible nor advisable to abolish even when strictly 
technical reasons seem to counsel such a step. In view of all these 
circumstances,, it would be impractical to propose a "model" of institutional 
organization for the. problem that is being studied here. 
Nevertheless, countries have some racial or cultural elements in 
common; they may be of the same origin or culture, have developed to much 
the sene level or be faced with the same technical problems (in engineer-
ing^ agrono*ay or economy). Hence, their experience can be shared to a 
certain extents Moreover, some of the principles underlying the technique 
of programming economic development have been enriched by experience in 
other fields of human activity which they have clearly drawn upon to good 
purpose. 
Of all the types of administrative organization examined in this 
chapter, those reviewed in chapter I, sections 2 and 3$ have obviously 
produced the best results as regards the utilization of water resources. 
The choice between a private association in which the State ha3 an 
interest or a public organization that is highly decentralized will 
depend.partly on the political philosophy of the country in question and 
partly on the need to emancipate such organizations in order to increase 
their efficiency. A few countries, of which Chile is one, have succeeded 
in freeing many of their organizations from the pressure of political 
interests. Although such pressure does not impair administrative 
efficiency, it is evident that administrative and executive decentraliza-
tion, combined with the concentration in regional bodies of powers that 
are normally dispersed among the different Government ministries or 
departments, can have a very favourable influence-on the implementation 
of river basin development programmes, for the simple reason that the 
2/ Report on the seminar on organization and administration of public 
£>N+.P-N-NRN Q^G - IN FVIO I N H N E F W ' A L -FS al r\ FTT./fiM 1 O /TJP.T1 / t -R> T O 
F I G U R E I E/CN. I2/303 
COMPARISON OF T H E VARIOUS T Y P E S OF ORGANIZATION FOR T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 
OF R I V E R B A S I N S OR R E G I O N S 
i — 
P R E S I D E N T 
OF T H E 
R E P U B L I C 





LI of^n.^i Imy^ ' 
X ^ a 
C ^^ RESOURCES 
i^yc^Ti©^ 
S. h E A L T H 
«. ECONOMY 
MHOCOEKnTOUlElD) 
a s E c w UK)nm 
s y ^ ® 




river basin is the common denominator of all problems which imposes a 
co-ordinated solution. 
Hence, the subject will be studied in the light of the foregoing 
remarks without any particular type of organization in mind. Figure 
I presents the three systems described below in diagramatic form. On 
the left-hand side is the ordinary ministerial or departmental type of 
organization, in the centre, a decentralized agency with functional-
territorial jurisdiction (an autonomous regional body), and on the right, 
a decentralized office dependent on a intern-ministerial committee. 
1. Ordinary ministerial (or departmental) organization -
(a) Independent action by the different offices 
A Government is usually organized on the so-called "horizontal" 
pattern, since it is divided into a series of ministries or departments 
which carry out their duties without any liaison other than their contact 
at the summit, i.e. their dependence on the President of the Republic or 
Prime Minister. The ministries are superimposed, from the territorial 
point of view, since each one has jurisdiction over the whole country. 
Their powers are distributed on a functional basis, that is to say, 
according to the activities assigned to each in its own field of action. 
This type of organization is quite Impractical for regional develop-
ment purposes, since it would result in the super-imposition, within a 
limited area, of officials from a series of unrelated departments who 
would have to depend on instructions given by their chiefs (ministers or 
secretaries of State) who, being outside the area, would often have 
little knowledge of the region's problems and no direct contact with 
them. 
Moreover, the ability to take decisions, and therefore the efficiency 
of the public administration as it is at present, is impaired by cumbersome 
routine formalities. This slowness is chiefly a Result of the controls 
that have to be placed when public funds.are involved. 
The problem is so familiar that there seems little need to enlarge 
upon it any further here 
3/ See E/CN.11/I&T/103, op. cit., p. 12 and A.D. Gorwala, op. cit.. p. 13. 
. . /(b) Inter-office 
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(b) Inter-office (inter-ministerial) agreements 
The simplest solution for the situation that has just been described 
would be the conclusion of inter-office agreements for the co-ordination 
of activities. This might be done on a national or regional scale. 
Esprit de corps is apt, however, to weaken these agreements. This problem 
has already acquired serious proportions in the United States with respect 
to water resources, and has been discussed in several well-known reports. 
Offices that are in different departments but deal with the same matters 
and even work in the same places base their plans of action or appraisal 
of situations on criteria that are dictated by their own partial and 
individual objectives, and are disinclined to accept those of the otherso 
Inter-office agreements are capable of remedying this situation to some extent, 
especially at top levels, but they cannot eliminate the problem altogether 
since they are powerless to destroy the team spirit among loweivranking 
officials. In chapter II, reference is made to a general agreement that 
was signed in the United States between federal agencies concerned with 
water resources and regional committees set up to work in the same field. 
The same procedure has been adopted on a regional basis in the 
Philippines for the river Marikina project; the committee is composed 
of the chief engineers of the National Power Corporation, the Bureau of 
Public Works and the Metropolitan Water District, under the chairmanship 
of an official from the National Economic Council(which is for develop-
ment purposes). The committee meets weekly to project and co-ordinate 
the studies that each body undertakes separately. The Hokkaido Develop-
ment Bureau in Japan^ and the Bhakra Nangal and Hirakud Boards in India^ 
operate along similar lines. 
Mexico has similar regional development commissions. Only two have 
legal status (Papaloapán and Tepalcatepec), while the others are administrative 
in nature. They are presided over by the Secretary (Minister) for Water 
Resources, (Secretario de Recursos Hidráulicos) who delegates his executive 
responsibilities to an official who is always an engineer in Government 
employ. The third member (secretary) represents both the Ministry of 
Uj Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water resources 
development in Asia and the Far East. Flood control series N° 9> op* 
cit., pp. 49, 52 and 428. 
c/ qt/tma/m In n n 
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National Property (Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales) and that of Finance» 
The Act of 19 December 1951 gave these commissions exclusive control 
over their own property and the administration of their income, transferred 
public lands in the river basins to them and conferred upon them certain 
powers of taxation. The President of the Republic retains many powers 
for himself, such as those of approving budgets, wage-scales and respective 
work programmes. The members of the Commission are directly responsible 
to him» The Commission has also been given the power of promulgating 
regjalations, in matters falling within their jurisdiction, that concern 
the integrated development of the areas under their control. The Comisión 
Hidrológica de la Cuenca del Valle de México is for study and planning 
purposes only, and is composed of representatives of the Government (the 
manager of the construction works in the Valle who represents the Ministry 
of Water Resources, and three engineers acting on behalf of the Federal 
Dictrict Government and the States of Hidalgo and Mexico), and of private 
associations (College of Civil Engineers and Association of Architects)» ' 
2, Decentralized organizations (autonomous bodies) 
There are two types of decentralization: functional and territorial. 
With regard to the first, the higher authority delegates its powers in 
specific questions to an agency which it has itself set up, thereby 
conferring on it the right to take an independent decision in such matters. 
Territorial decentralization takes place when the delegation of powers is 
made rationae loci» that is, when they are confined to specific zones. 
Centralization and decentralization may also be undertaken as regards the 
internal organization of an office. If an office has members in the 
field which continue to act under its authority, its internal organization 
will have been decentralized,^ Some exponents of administrative law also 
make a distinction between autonomy and self-sufficiency, stating that 
the first is the concern of political law and the second of administrative 
law. 
6/ Rafael Bielsa, Derecho administrativo, 4th.ed. Vol. II, El Ateneo, Buenos 
Aires, 1947> p. 8; Guillermo J. Cano, Las leyes de aguas en Sudamérica, 




(a) Offices with functional .jurisdiction 
(i) Ordinary autonomous bodies. With the exception of municipalities, 
which are examples of functional and territorial decentralization, the past 
evolution of administrative organizations shows that functional has 
always preceded territorial decentralization in the form of "self-sufficient 
bodies,", "public establishments" of "autonomous organizations". 
Many countries have set up offices of this kind to deal with some of 
7/ 
the uses of water resources, mainly electricity production and irrigation,-' 
but since they have always dealt with single uses, they have never become 
multi-purpose and integrated organizations, apart from the exceptions that 
will be enumerated later. 
Although these offices have all the advantages of decentralization 
(technical efficiency and powers of rapid decision), they are not exempt 
from some of the drawbacks inherent in the ordinary system of public 
administration. For instance, they are not based on a uniform system, 
but are organized with varying degrees of self-sufficiency as circumstances 
require. The executive authorities usually retain control over their 
general economic policy. 
What should be stressed here is that they are unsuitable for regional 
development programmes since they lack cohesion and co-ordination at the 
regional level. The fact that each one receives instructions from a 
head office situated outside the area hampers and slows down its work, 
and the high-ranking officials who formulate policy have no knowledge of 
local conditions or the necessary daily contact with them. In the United 
States, an attempt has been made to remedy this situation by means of 
inter-office agreements at the regional level, but practical results have 
not been encouraging so far. 
(ii) State enterprises. State enterprises are more decentralized. 
They usually consist of autonomous bodies which have been transformed into 
State enterprises by the acquisition of an even greater degree of independence. 





The concept of the State enterprise does not consist in the attainment 
of greater independence only, but derives also from its particular 
internal structure and modus operandi, which resemble those of private 
enterprises and are far removed from the supervision typical of the 
usual organization of an office.^ 
The field of action of a State enterprise may cover the whole country 
as in the case of the Argentine Agua y Energía Eléctrica» When this is 
so, the enterprises fall within the classification under consideration 
here. There are also State enterprises whose activities are circumscribed 
to a specific zone. 
Autonomous State enterprises suffer from the same drawbacks as those 
described in the previous paragraph with regard to autonomous regional 
bodies. 
It' should be added that the type of State enterprise that is under 
departmental (or ministerial) authority, i.e. which is responsible to or. 
connected with one ministry, is usually less efficient than that under 
9/ 
inter-departmental administration;-^ in the latter case, the board of 
directors includes representatives of the various ministries directly 
or indirectly concerned with the activities of the enterprise, and this 
introduces an element of co-ordination that is lacking in the case of the 
former. 
(b) Offices with functional-territorial jurisdiction 
It has already been stated that, even though municipalities belong 
to this kind of institutional structure, they have been excluded from 
this study since they have a different organization and raison dTetre. 
This category also includes some organizations which have functional-
territorial autonomy but are single-purpose only. For instance, Rione 
was established in Uruguay^/ for the study, projection and construction 
8/ ST/TAA/M/7> pp. 13, 16 and 29. 
9/ E/CN.11/I&Í/103, p. 12. 
10/ Usinas y Teléfonos del Estado (UTE), Aprovechamiento Hidroeléctrico 





of hydroelectric works at Rincón del Bonete, on the River Negro. This 
office was functional (limited to the production of hydroelectricity) 
and territorial (confined tto the district of Rincón del Bonete) and had 
a single purpose, since it was not intended to promote the integrated 
development of the region or to attain any other objective. • 
. This is also the case with respect to the Australian Snowy Mountains 
Hydroelectric. Authority,^^ and-the St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation, the 
Port of New York Authority, and the Delaware River Port Authority, etc. 
in the United States. -
There are two kinds of organizations of the type under consideration: 
autonomous regional multi-purpose agencies and "districts"; the latter, 
which are known by this name in the United States but have different 
titles in other countries, will be studied later. 
In general, the disadvantage of such organizations is that they 
have no say in cabinet meetings and are therefore unable to take part in 
the formulation of national programmes or to present their own problems 
in this respect. On the other hand, one of their attributes, which may 
be deemed an advantage, is that their long-term programmes are approved 
by Congress on an over-all basis, which frees them from what would other-
wise be an annual dependence on the decision of Congress which, in the 
case of ordinary autonomous bodies, often paralyses or slows down their 
activities 
In several countries (the United States, Argentina, etc.), it was 
found necessary to standardize the legislation for this type or organiza-
tion after a few had been established separately. The United States 
Government Corporation Control Act^^ has attempted to standardize their 
accounting procedures and has made it obligatory for them to draw-up a 
commercial-type budget (section 102). The privileges of the TVA have 
been left intact (section 104) since, although its accounts have to be 
11/ Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water resources 
development in Asia and the Far East. Flood control series N° 9> op« 
cit., p. 51. 
12/ Roscoe'Martin, op. cit., p. 27. 




looked over by the General Accounting Office, it is allowed to maintain 
them according to its own Statutes rather than the less flexible 
regulations of the latter. 
(i) Multi-purpose regional autonomous bodies. The T V A t h e 
United States is an example of this type of organization (and has served 
as a model for the others), as well as the DVC in India, the CVC in 
Colombia, the Corporación del Santa in Peru, the Gal Oya Development 
Board in Ceylon and the Comissao do Vale de Sao Francisco in Brazil. 
All these are "public corporations'1. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
this term is understood to mean an official organization which has its 
own political and juridical personality (in public and private law), as 
distinct from that of the Government as a whole, autonomy in its internal 
organization ana, to a certain extent, in its external activities, and 
its own property. It may also appear in court on its own behalf, and has 
rights of succession and of using its own seal; the latter is merely a 
formal right but is invariably included in all instruments creating organiza-
tions of this kind*^/ Other details concerning the scope of their functions 
vary from one case to the other. 
The following characteristics have been mentioned as those of the 
ideal regional development organization: 
(a) It should be semi-autonomous, of the "quasi-corporate11 type; 
(b) The central Government should direct and supervise high policy 
and over-all programme aims; 
(c) It should maintain a proper balance among national and regional 
interests and purposes when establishing its objectives and 
guiding policies; 
(d) A good balance should be achieved between centralized national 
policy control and decentralized regional administration of 
programming; 
14/ For the significance of these abbreviations, see the Annex. 
15/ Roscoe Martin, op. cit., p. 26 (chapter by Joseph Swidler); Finer, 
op. cit«, p. 113. 
l6/ Roy Bessey, " The unified water resources development plan", Proceedings 
of the regional technical conference on water resources development in 
Asia and the Far East. Flood control series N° 9, op* cit., p. 448 and 
C.S. Parthasarathy, "Organizational set-up for execution of water 




(e) All main offices should be situated in the region; 
(f) The organization' should have a small, compact board of directors 
responsible for general policy, programme, operations and public 
relations control, although all operations should be in the hands of 
a single responsible general manager; 
(g) Technical and advisory committees should be set up in which 
official organizations and private local interests .could 
participate; 
(h) The co-operation of suitable experts and of a good group of 
specialists in regional programming should be obtained. 
It has also been stated that an .agency of this type should be created 
only after a project has been studied in sufficient detail and a sound 
approximate estimate of its cost made. This opinion coincides with an 
observation by the United Nations Panel of Experts,underlining the 
need for changing to another kind of administrative organization once the 
programming stage had been superseded by that of execution. However, 
according to TV A experts, this should be only a "reorganization" instead 
of a complete change, since they consider it highly advisable that the 
successive stages of programming, -projecting, construction and operation 
should be in the hands of one organization in order to ensure continuity and 
uniformity of ideas between the concept and its execution® Hence it might 
be possible to begin with a small programming organization which could be 
enlarged and adapted in due course. 
It is also considered essential that parliament should give its 
prior blanket approval to the programmes and that all investment should 
be authorized in toto beforehand, in order to forestall subsequent inter-
ventions or delays in the. executive phase.^^ 
The faculties granted to agencies of this kind should be defined and 
limited both functionally and territorially. As regards the first aspect, 
the agencies will be able to undertake only such duties as have been expressly 
assigned to them, and all other matters germane to official activity 
Y¡¡ E/3066, p. 46. 




(supervisory and executive) will devolve upon the usual organs of the 
administration. Even questions that are recognized to be within their 
competence will be dealt with as provided for by general legislation, 
unless otherwise authorized. These agencies are not "super-States"¿2/ 
but simply single bodies in which a number of clearly defined official 
functions háve been grouped instead of being divided among various offices 
as is customary, with the aim of unifying and co-ordinating activities in 
order to achieve the specific objective of regional development. Thus, the 
following official activities usually remain outside the competence of such 
bodies (even though they may be within its sphere of action): the administra-
tion of justice, security police, defence, education, public health and 
political government, to name only the most important. Territorial 
jurisdiction is delimited in order to mark out the zone in which"the 
regional body may exercise its powers, which are also functionally 
limited. It is not intended in so doing to establish the omnipotence 
of the agency within its own jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other 
forms of government, but merely to indicate that it will have no powers 
outside the boundary line,. 
The main principles on which an organization of this kind is based 
will be systematically described below, in order to indicate their general 
tenor: 
1. Functional jurisdiction: powers. The Gal Oyá Development Board in 
Ceylon is responsible for water and electric development, afforestation, 
anti-erosion measures, public health, the control of animal and plant 
diseases, agriculture, industry and cultural progress. It has jurisdic-
tion over two zones: one that is developed and includes pre-existing towns, 
I • 
and the other, under-developed. In the latter, the Board acts on behalf 
of various official organizations which have delegated their powers to it 
(State land and electricity offices), and also wields authority in its own 
right. In the developed zone, it merely plans and co-ordinates. 
,12/ Lawrence Durisch, "TVA, state and local government", in Roscoe Martin, 




The Corporación del Cauca (Colombia) is intended to produce and co-
ordinate- private .electricity supplies, to organize flood control, irriga-
tion,' drainage, anti-pollution measures, soil conservation and reforesta-
tion, State-owned forests, communications and transport; to regulate 
municipal and industrial uses of water and to safeguard and develop . 
the exploitation of.mineral resources and wild fauna and flora» 
The Corporación del Santa (Peru)'develops and exploits naturál 
resources in the river basin bearing the same name, and the mineral 
and industrial riches of other basins which have to use the port of 
Chimbóte» The Corporación is also responsible for constructing and 
operating public works in the same areas and exploiting mineral and 
industrial resources in others related to its own zones. Lastly, it 
administers the public services that the Government has assigned to it. 
The Comisión del Papaloapán (Mexico) has to build defence works, 
look after irrigation, energy and drinking water supplies, sewage, and 
transport and communications (including railways and telephones) and 
deal with urbanization problems. 
'The. Cassa per i,l Mezzogiorno (Italy) is responsible for agricultural 
development, irrigation,, flood control, anti-erosion measures, roads, 
railways, the tourist industry, and agricultural industries and administers 
the private credits granted for these purposes. 
The functions of the TVA.wiirbe described in chapter II» 
The Comissao do Vale do Sao Francisco (Brazil), is in charge ¡of 
water, industrial and agricultural development in the valley of that name, 
: as well as of transport, immigration and settlement, social welfare, 
1 education, public health and the utilization of natural resources. In 
order to carry out these duties, it may either act itself or promote and 
co-ordinate the action of other official organizations (federal or State) 
or private enterprises. 
The DVC (India) is responsible for the construction and operation of 
irrigation-works, and for flood control, hydroelectricity and navigation. 
It also deals with problems of afforestation, erosion, public helath and 
agricultural and industrial development in its own area. It is important 




Governments: (a) with respect to irrigation, it has to hand over -
responsibility to them for distributing the whole "water supply; (b ) : 
as regards community and industrial supplies, it may sell water to the,« -
users directly; (c) hydroelectric energy cannot be sold at less than-' 
30 000 volts (which means that retail supplies are in the hands of local 
Governments),while the DVC has a monopoly of the production after a 
minimum level of 10 000 kW installed capacity and of distribution and 
sales over the 30 000 volt limit. 
2. Territorial .jurisdiction. Finer rightly points out that any enlarge-
ment of the area of a regional development project depends on the nature 
of the resource to be developed, since it may be less than a square mile 
(a mine) or cover a whole continent (energy), and that existing divisions 
in the world (inter- or intra-national) do not by themselves constitute 
self-sufficient economic unitsJ^^ 
The legislation examined indicates a great variety of ways of delimiting 
the territorial zone of jurisdiction. Thus, the competence of the Delaware 
River Port Authority extends over an area of 35 miles around Camden; that of 
the Potomac Commission, over the entire river basin and tributaries; the Ohio 
Commission over all the territory of the eight States whose waters flow 
into the river Ohio or into its tributaries. The area of the Gal Oya Board 
is designated by law, which specifies the geographical boundaries but 
provides for their extension by ministerial decision. The Board is also 
authorized to have offices and warehouses outside its zone. 
The DVC's zone of operations is also fixed by the agreement which 
fcreated it, but its limits may be extended beyond the valley by official 
decision. 
In the Valle del Cauca, the territorial limits of jurisdiction have 
been fixed by the Government upon the, recommendations of the CVC!s steering 
council. 
In Argentina, the river Bermejo Treaty (signed on 31 January 1958 .and 
awaiting ratification) fixed a zone of influence stretching 30 kilometres 
on each bank of the artificial canals to be constructed. 




If this kind of definition is omitted, a regional agencyrs powers' 
would cover the whole territory of the political body which created it, 
i.e., they would extend outside the valley or zone that it is intended to 
develop. . 
3. Composition and appointment of authorities. All "studies on this 
subject agree that it is an advantage for a regional body to have two 
superior authorities: a directorate or board, composed of a few 
people, which would be primarily concerned with policy-making, i.e., it 
would take all essential decisions as to the agency's politico-economic 
activities and supervise its work; (b) a general executive manager who 
would be responsible for manning the agency.—^ Even the system of a 
board of directors consisting of the heads of the departments into which 
the agency is divided (functional boards) is considered inadvisable, 
since these heads of departments cannot form a picture of the work as a 
whole and each might be tempted to give priority to the work of his own 
department. 
K.. K. Sinha, in his examination of the DVCrs organization, criticises 
the fact that (l) the financial adviser, representing the central Govern-
ment, may overrule and thus restrict the authority of the board of 
directors by means of his implicit right of veto; (2) the secretary of 
the board is elected not by the board but by the Government; (c) 
participating Governments have, in practice, reduced the autonomy legally 
conferred upon the DVC; and (4) there is no general executive manager (the 
Bhakra Board is praised for having one).—/ 
In relation to the Gal Oya Board, Mr. Sinha disapproves of the fact 
that one of the directors represents the Ministry of Finance on the grounds 
that."departmental (ministerial) pull" continues to affect the regional v 
body. As this director may at any time be replaced by his Minister, 
he cannot have a feeling of solidarity with the Board. 
21/ John Oliver,, "Administrative foundation", in Roscoe Martin, op. cit., 
p. 42; C. Parthasarathy, op. cit.» p.. 430; Sinha, ibid., p. 438. 




The ways in which the authorities may be nominated"vary considerably 
according to the constitutional organization of each State. Thus,- the 
three directors of the TVA are appointed by the President of the United 
States, with the approval of the Senate, for a term of nine years. The 
Cauca Council has seven members who serve for three years each, four of 
whom are nominated by the President of the Republic, while the other three 
are ex officio the Governors of the provinces concerned. There is also 
an executive director, nominated by the council, and a senior administrative 
chief, who may issue resolutions that create or modify the rights of each 
member. The director may speak but not vote in the council. 
The Comissao do ..Vale do Sao Francisco has three directors who are 
appointed by the President. 
Since programming and construction are lengthy processes, it is 
better to make appointments for long periods, as in the TVA, since 
frequent, changes of directors are apt to impair the continuity of the 
work* It may be pointed out in this connexion that the President of 
the United States is elected for four years, while the directors of the 
TVA serve for nine years, i.e. more than twice the presidential term of 
office.^ 
4* Control of the regional body by the Government that established it 
This control, which is indispensable in a democratic régime, may be 
exercised in many ways. 
One is control by the people, i.e., by users and consumers who form 
associations for this purpose. The efficacy of this method has recently 
been successfully demonstrated, chiefly in the United Kingdom with respect 
to water and electricity supplies. 24/ ' ' . 
Another method is that of parliamentary, control.. The way in which 
this should be applied depends on the traditions and customs of the 
parliament concerned. It has already been pointed out that parliament 
22/ ST/TAA/M/7, P. 36. 




should study and give its blanket approval to programmes and investments. 
This would prevent regional offices from having to seek its approval 
annually and, while waiting for the necessary authorization which is 
often held up, to have their work impeded or even paralyzed. In the 
case of the TVA, the United States Congress has approved aggregate sums 
for its projects, thereby departing from its usual custom of making an 
itemized study of projected expenditure. A similar system has been adopted 
for the St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation, which was authorized to invest up 
to a total of 105 million dollars, 10 per cent to be spent in the first 
year and 40 per cent in the remainder. 
The programmes of the Comissao do-Vale do Sao Francisco have to be 
approved by the Brazilian Congress. 
Control by a higher administrative authority; with which the regional 
body is connected and to which it is in a certain degree responsible, also 
admits of many gradations. The Comissao do Vale do Sao Francisco, for 
instance, which has autonomy as regards its property, may not nominate 
its own employees who are appointed by the President of the Republic. 
This power is vested in the directors in nearly all other regional 
organizations. In Ceylon, the Gal Qya Board must have governmental 
consent before appointing its foreign employees. 
The Government of India indicates the policy to be followed by the 
DVC and gives instructions to its board of directors. The Governments 
represented on the Bhakra Board have to ratify all the Board's fundamental 
decisions. 
The Gal Oya Board is also bound to comply with ministerial instructions. 
The programmes of the Corporación del Cauca must be approved by the 
National Planning Board (Consejo Nacional de Planeación). 
The Papaloapán and íepalcatépec commissions, in Mexico have to submit 
their programmes, wage-scales and other matters for presidential approval. 
As regards auditing, the General Accounting Office in the United 
States audits the accounts of the TVA and other public corporations, but one 
of the amendments to the Statute of the TVA provides that it may use its own 
auditing methods in common with private companies instead of being obliged 
/to adopt 




to adopt the Official system of the Accounting Office.-^ 
The Tribunal Federal do Contas do Brasil audits the. accounts of the 
Comissao. do Vale do Sao Francisco which is responsible to the Federal 
Government only. The same occurs in the case of the Gal Oya Board. A 
State official audits the accounts of the Cauca Commission; he is nominated 
by the President who also fixes his salary though it is paid by the 
Commission, as are those of his assistants. The Corporación Peruana 
del Santa is obliged to send its balance-sheets to the Banks Department 
(Superintendencia de Bancos) and to the Government, but if these have 
made no comment within a certain time, it is taken to indicate tacit 
approval of the accounts. . The auditing is done by a private firm. 
The Canadian River Commission (United States) is not subject to the 
accounting laws of its member States, and its auditing has to be carried 
2 Lf : 
out by a qualified independent public auditor,-^ 2' 
Each of the Governments concerned maintains separate control over 
the accounts of other inters-State commissions.^-^ 
In Argentina, the accounts of the OIANA are checked by the official 
auditors of the province of Tucumán, which is one of the participants in 
the organization and where the head office is situated.^' The books of 
the OIACSE are initiated by the general auditors of the-two'constituent 29/ provinces, each of whom may make a separate examination.—' 
5. Internal administrative organization. An expert of the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Administration—/ who has been studying this 
problem in particular, has recommended that all regional development 
organizations concerned primarily with the utilization of water resources 
25/ Finer, op. cit., p. 152. 
26/ 66 Stat. 74, sec. IX (b). 
27/ New England.,- Potomac., Breaks and Palisades. 
,28/ Internal regulations, article 54. 
29/ Internal regulations, articles 10 and 14. 
30/ Roy Bessey, "The unified water resources development plan", Proceedings 
of the.regional technical conference on water resources development in 




shóüld have departments or divisions dealing specifically with:. (a;) the • 
direct handling (administrative, planning, budgeting; . fi^ a^ clng'-and 4 
operation) of Activities such as the utilization of a river; and.;;its waters, 
the production of hydroelectricity and the preparation of,land for cultiva-
tion; (b) co-ordination of the different programmes related to the exploita-
tion of a river basin (land, forest, pasture, crops, etc.); (c) the co-
operative administration of parallel subsidiary programmes for minerals, raw 
materials and the development of basic industries; (d) the close co-ordina-
tion of physical planning with the other economic and social programmes 
which concern regional communities, families and even individuals, thereby 
obtaining the maximum yield from basic physical development. 
Figures II, III, IV and V present in diagrammatic form the internal 
systems of organization of the TVA,. the CVC, the DVC and the Comissao do 
Vale do Sao Francisco, respectively. The TVA and CVC are under the 
statutory obligation to model their internal organization on that of a 
private enterprise. 
6. Relations with the local authorities and public. TVA experts 
accord the highest importance to this aspect in order to ensure the efficient 
operation of regional agencies which is largely dependent on the goodwill 
and spirit of co-operation displayed by the p u b l i c T h e TVA has laid 
special emphasis on the payments in lieu of taxes "which it makes to local 
Governments. 
It is also considered essential that the directors of a regional 
agency should reside in the area under their jurisdiction* This is 
expressly stipulated in the act that established the TVA, The CVC has 
its head office at Cali, which is the centre of its zone of action. The 
act creating the St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation states (sec. 4> ch. 6) 
that for judicial purposes the Corporation will be considered as adjacent 
to the judicial district in the northern area-of New York State. The 
Corporación del Santa, on the other hand, is situated in Lima instead of 
in its own area, while' the Argentine. CIACSE is in Frías, which is the site 
of .its activities. 
32/ Ackerman and Lewry, Proceedings of the regional technical conference 
on water resources development in Asia and the Far East, op. cit.. 
p. 444; Clapp, idem., p. 73. See also ST/TAA/M/7. p. 87, 
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In numerous cases (e.g. the Gulf States Marines Fisheries Compact, 
DVC, etc.), provision has been made for the appointment of advisory com-
32/ mrttees consisting of representatives of private local interests. —• 
7. Guiding principles for their activities. Various instruments that 
created regional bodies have laid down their basic principles of policy. 
For instance, the Delaware River Port Authority must uphold the United States 
principle of free competitive private enterprise (section IV). The CVC 
has to act as an example and training school for personnel who will sub-
sequently organize other agencies of the same kind; it must also guarantee 
the profitability of its investment, which rules out the use of capital 
for development or non-recoverable expenditure, and stimulates private 
enterprise. The Bear River Commission is obliged to adopt the principle 
of integrated programming without regard to political limits (section VI). 
The Costilla^Creek agreement (United States) embodies a similar principle 
(section I). 
The River Bermejo treaty (Argentina) which is awaiting ratification, 
specifies the order of priority for future uses of water: (a) navigation, 
(b) community supplies, (c) rural drinking water, (d) industrial uses, and 
(e) irrigation. 
8. Staff recruitment and training. One of the biggest problems 
confronting all regional development offices is the scarcity or lack 
of competent technical personnel at all levels from.senior officials to 
specialized workers. This is, of course, a problem that is bound to 
crop up in the kind of organization that always operates in under-developed 
zones. It would be worth while for steps to be taken to deal with it 
during the early stages of the agencies1 establishment. Robock says^^ 
that such steps were found to be a pre-reguisite during the preliminary 
stage of the work on the development of north-east Brazil. The DVC's 
Board of Directors has stressed its importance in its reports. The CVC 
is expressly authorized to sign agreements with educational bodies for 
32/ ST/TAA/M/7, p. 85. 




this purpose. The TVA has already done so, particularly with the local 
universities (Alabama and Tennessee), and has also made direct arrangements 
with or subsidized State Government offices in its region responsible for 
public education. The Corporación del Santa maintains a technical school 
to train workers for its projects. 
HSM^^SESS.* Many of these regional bodies enjoy privileges such 
as monopolies or tax exemptions. The DVC has the electricity monopolies 
already mentioned, but is liable to taxation like any private enterprise. 
The TVA, on the other hand, is being strongly opposed by private 
electricity companies, which accuse it of using the taxpayers' money,* 
paying little or no interest, and being exempt from taxes, all of which 
/ 
gives it an unfair advantage as regards rates over its rivals in the 
private sector. Many regional agencies may establish rates or taxes 
and fix and charge a tariff for their services. 
In general, they have the right to expropriate real estate or 
exercise servitudes of aqueductus or electroductus, after due indemnization. 
(ii) "DistrictsThe other form of decentralized functional-
territorial administration that will be considered here is that of the 
"districts" for irrigation, drainage or conservation (United States) or 
"channel authorities" (Mendoza, Argentina). 
This type of organization appears,in.a variety of forms, only some 
of which are relevant here. Frank Adams summarizes them in this way: 
(a) irrigation, drainage or land improvement districts (including super-
districts of "comarca" or county size formed by a group of smaller 
districts); (b) co-operatives or mutual-aid societies for irrigation 
purposes, which are non-profit-making and may or may not have juridical 
personality; and (c) irrigation societies for commercial purposes. 
3¡J Frank Adams, Community organization for irrigation in the United 
States, FAO development papers N° 1, Rome, 1953; Wells A. Hutchins, 
Organization and operation of co-operative irrigation companies, 
Farm Credit Administration, Washington, 1936; United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Mutual irrigation companies, and Commercial 
irrigation companies, Washington, 1929 and 1930; Guillermo J. Cano, 




The first of .these includes the channel authorities that are to be 
found in various provinces of.Argentina (Mendoza, Salta, etc.); their 
statutes have force of law and they are endowed with their own powers 
by the State Governments. They are. thus in fact decentralized official 
organisations. They may prescribe and levy taxes, draw up regulations 
and exercise jurisdictional functions among their members. The directors 
are elected by the users» It is all-important that there should be a 
close connexion between this type of agency and regional development 
organizations as regards programmes for the utilization of water resources, 
since the former should take charge of water distribution for irrigation 
or drinking purposes, hydroelectricity supply and the maintenance and 
management of secondary aqueducts. 
The other two types described by Adams (co-operatives and commercial 
societies), which are private companies with governmental powers, fit 
more appropriately into the last category of companies (3 (d)). 
These districts and channel authorities are "functionally" restricted 
to the construction apd administration of irrigation and drainage systems 
or related activities, and "territorially" circumscribed to the zone served 
by a canal or irrigation system. They are not of course intended to 
promote integrated development although some are multi-purpose. 
In the United-States, the provisions creating "districts" have force 
of law. A salient feature of these districts is that participation in 
them may be compulsory even.though certain individuals are opposed to it, 
and that such participation involves the contribution of funds for its 
operation together with the right to share in the administration and to 
enjoy the benefits it provides* Thus, for instance, landowners who are 
interested in draining a certain region may persuade the competent 
authority to form a "drainage district" in it; if this is done, all the 
landowners in the zone - including those who oppose such an initiative 
- will be obliged to contribute financially to the district and to carry 
out the necessary work,- provided that the majority agree that the work 
should be done® 
. These districts may be formed for the most varied purposes, such the 
construction and operation of irrigation systems - with surface or under-




falow land for cultivation, etc. 
In order to organize the Port of. New York into a body of this kind, 
a "port district" was created by law. This means that all owners of 
real estate within the new district have to pay a certain sum for improve-
ments, which was intended to compensate for the rise in the value of their 
property and other benefits accruing to. them as- a result of the 
operation of the port. In order to organize the Ohio River Valley Sanita-
I 
tion Commission, a "district" was set up with the same results, which more-
over places all those living in the Commission's zone of influence under 
its jurisdiction in so far as its specific field of action is concerned. 
"Conservation districts", such as that of the Inter-State Commission for 
the Potomac river basin, have also been established to combat water 
pollution. 
This type of administrative organization may also be put to other 
purposes. It may, for instance, be used for the formation of districts 
to deal with agricultural plagues frosts and hail. These activities 
require the co-operation of all the inhabitants of the region in question 
if the cost of the work is to be reduced and its efficacy guaranteed,, 
Nevertheless, the recalcitrant attitude of certain, landowners, and, from 
time to time, the opposition or abstention of one of them, frustrate the 
efforts of the others, for example, with regard to drainage or anti-fruit-
pest campaigns o Thus the agricultural and industrial development which 
may be expected of every integrated project for the development of a river 
\ 
basin may require this type of organization in order to supplement on the 
spot the general work of the regional body. Moreover, without an additional 
effort of this kind, the regional agency would be forced to curtail some 
of its activities. 
3c State companies 
In order to carry out its industrial or commercial activities, the 
State normally adopts the form of a: "company", i.e., the type of 
administrative and juridical organization of a private enterprise. It 
also adopts it for public utilities, as for instance the Bnpresa Nacional 
de Electricidad, S. A. (ENPESA) in Chile, the Companhia: Hidroelétrica 




The following are some of the reasons which have been given for the 
creation of public enterprises r^^lack of private capital, the prevalence 
of the principle of State control over natural resources and the assumption 
by the Government of control over large bankrupt private enterprises which 
might create a social problem if they were to close down entirely* 
The fields in which the State most frequently intervenes are the 
development of water and energy resources, national transport services 
and certain large-scale, activities of a monopolistic nature such as the 
iron and steel industry. 
State enterprises have already been studied, though only those which 
are entirely under State ownership, or, to be more precise, under the 
control of a Government office. They are "enterprisesu rather than 
Government "companies", since a "company" with only one partner is an 
impossibility. All companies require at least two partners or owners. 
What will be discussed here are the State "companies", in other words, 
organizations whose property is owned by and administration divided among 
more than one State office at the same- or at different levels. 
(a) Among officials bodies 
The Corporación del Valle del Cauca (CVC) belongs to this category. 
Although it was organized by the federal Government alone, the governors 
of the three provinces concerned (known as departments in Colombia) are 
ex officio members of the board of directors. The assets which 
are given to it by other public bodies (particularly.local Governments) 
confer upon the donors (article 18 of the Statutes) the right to recover 
such assets upon the liquidation of the Corporación. For this.reason, the 
property of the Corporación is held in co-ownership by the different 
contributors but there is.no private participation. 
(b) Between one official body and private persons (.joint company)*^/ 
The SOMISA in Argentina, which consists of the Department of Military 
Manufactures (Dirección general de Fabricaciones Militares) and various 
private iron and steel companies, belongs to this type. As only one official 
35/ E/CN.11/I&T/103, p. 6 
36/ ST/TAA/M/7, p. 21. /body is 
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body is'involved., the only problems of inter-relationship that can arise 
are those deriving from relations between the Government and private 
persons. In the United States, organizations of this kind come under 
the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 (section 201). 
> 
(c) Among several official bodies and private persons or companies (.joint 
company) 
This type poses the dual problem of relations among the official . 
bodies themselves and between them and private persons or companies. 
ENDESA in Chile is a clear example of this kind, since its share-
holders consist of the Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento 
de la Producción), which is an autonomous Government body, ten municipalities, 
three semi-public companies and seven private enterprises, although the 
last mentioned hold no more than 0.1 per cent of the social capital. The 
ENDESA has been set up in the form of a joint stock company and is governed 
by the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) without any amendment and enjoys 
no special privilege. 
Brazil has the Companhia Hidroelétrica do Sao Francisco which was 
organized by the federal Government for the development of energy produc-
tion on a stretch of the Sao Francisco river. Its stock is in two series. 
The A series (200 million cruzeiros' worth of ordinary shares) was subscribed 
entirely by the federal Government, which may sell up to 49 per cent of the 
total to other State agencies, preferably pension funds. The B series 
consists of preferential shares which do not entitle the holders to vote 
but pay a special minimum dividend of 6 per cent. It also amounts to 200 
million cruzeiros and was opened to public subscription. The four-man 
board of directors is elected by the assembly, at which only Government 
shareholders are allowed to vote, although, as stated before, 49 per cent 
of their stock may be held by autonomous bodies which can therefore take 
part in the election. There is also a fiscal council (syndicate) of three 
members likewise elected by the assembly. The representatives of each 




State (province) served from another council of a purely advisory nature. 
The chairman of the company, who is appointed by the President of the 
Republic, may overrule the decisions of the board of directors* 
The French Compagnie Nationale du Rhone (CNR)--^ /±s the best and 
clearest example of this type of organization, and has achieved very 
successful results* An Act of 7 May 1921 provided that a company, whose 
statutes were to be established by law5 would be given a concession for 
the multi-purpose development of the river Rhone, and that if such a 
company could not be formed, the river would be divided into six sections 
for which an equal number of concessions would be granted, although all 
the concessionaries were to act in co-operation. The main objectives of 
the act were the integrated development of the river for navigation, 
irrigation and electricity production. One very special feature was 
its provision that an area lying outside the river basin (the department 
of the SeineN around Paris) should receive part of the energy produced and 
contribute to the financing of the projects, which was later duly carried 
out, • 
The company has registered capital of 2 400 million francs® It may 
issue up to 99 per cent of this amount in bonds that can be amortized in 
50 years from the date on which the works financed by such bonds are 
completed. For this purpose, each issue relates to a specific phase of 
the work* The bonds give a rate of interest /that is guaranteed by the 
State, and while this guarantee has to be provided, the shares pay no . 
dividends. Otherwise, they pay a dividend 2 points higher than some 
Government bonds- Twenty per cent of any profits left over after the 
payment of basic dividends is distributed among the shareholders, and 80 
per cent earmarked for reimbursing to the State, without interest, the 
38/ Its statutes of 11 October 1932 were approved by the assembly on 27 
May 1933* The decree of concession of 5 June 1934 approved the contract 
for the same purpose signed on 20 December 1933- Other documents 
relating to the CNR are the Public Administration Regulations of 13 
Janizary 1931, promulgated under the Act of 1921, and the General Load 
Log, appended to the decree of concession* See Compagnie Nationale 
du RhSne, Recueil des textes constjtutjfs, Lyon, 1951, and Rapport á 




sum paid by the latter as guaranteed interest on the bonds. When the 
CNR has wiped out its debt to the State, the profits over and above the 
basic dividend are divided in equal proportions among the shareholders 
and the Government. In 1957, a dividend of 6-539 per cent was paid. 
Nine-tenths of the cost of pumping irrigation water and of 
irrigation channels are subsidised by the State without any reimbursement 
charge. Moreover, this use of energy has first priority. The CNR bears 
the cost of all other works» 
The capital has been divided into four series of 600 million francs 
each: .  
Series A: open to municipalities, official bodies and chambers of 
commerce in the Paris region (department of the Seine); 
Series B: open to municipalities, official bodies and chambers of 
commerce in the Rhone basin; 
Series C: subscribed by the French railways (State-run); 
Series D: subscribed almost entirely by Electricité de France (official), 
a branch company of the CNR and private user. 
The shares are nominal and transferable only to persons included 
in the categories for the respective series. 
A small number of shares in series D are held by the Société 
pour l'Amenagement du Rhone, which is affiliated to the CNR, and the 
bulk by Electriclté de France. Series A has been entirely subscribed 
by the Government of the Seine department, i.e. by a local governmental 
body outside the Rhone basin- Series B, on the other hand, has been 
subscribed by more than 250 chambers of commerce and municipalities and 
by the Governments of departments in the Rhone basin. The chambers of 
commerce are private associations of businessmen and industrialists. 
It has been legally decreed that two-thirds of the board of 
directors should consist of official representatives (from national, 
departmental and municipal Governments) and two-fifths of representatives 
from the central Government. Thus, out of a hypothetical total of 15 
directors, 10 should represent official bodies and at least six the 
Government of France. According to the statutes, the board consists of 




the French Government and each of the other four is elected by the share-
holders of each series meeting in partial assembly- The Chairman of the 
board is always a representative of the national Government. 
The State delegates have the right to request at the assemblies 
that an item be reopened for discussion and that their observations be 
incorporated in the records. The representatives of the central Govern-
ment in the board of directors may also ask for reconsideration of a 
question, and if the board insists on abiding by its original decision 
they have the right to demand a stay of execution for eight days until 
the Government has made a statement on the matter- If no such statement 
is made, the board may carry out its decision on its own responsibility-
Accounts are audited by a commission of six members (three 
nominated by the Minister of Finance, of whom one is the Chairman, and 
three by the Minister of Public Works) and a Government inspector acts 
as Rapporteur. 
When 75 per cent of the capacity of a plant has been committed, 
the CNR is obliged to begin building-a new one- All projects for 
different uses such as irrigation, electricity and navigation must be 
carried out along parallel lines on each of the six sections of the river 
(except projects for international rivers which require the prior 
conclusion of an international treaty)-
The CNR has been granted the right to use the Rhone's waters 
and electricity potential according to requirements and provided that it 
complies with all the formalities (publicity, etc.) laid down in the 
water and electricity legislation in force, as would a private person. 
The concession may be withdrawn if the CNR fails to comply with the 
technical conditions which are required of it administratively (the 
maintenance of load logs). 
The CNR may impose servitudes under ordinary law. Consumers 
who hold shares in each plant amounting to at least 1/500 of its value 
have first option on the energy supply and the right to receive a grg 
rata share on the basis of their holdings of securities up to a limit of 




The rate fixed for optional energy for shareholders in Series A 
has to be equal to the cost of thermal energy produced in the Paris area 
(department of the Seine) where such shareholders must reside. 
The'rate charged for optional energy for shareholders in other 
areas (series B) must be equal to that of non-optional energy in the 
region and standard in every part of it (rates may be varied according 
to the time but not according to the amount of supply).. Shareholders of 
series A and B who do not opt to receive energy are given a 3-per-cent 
bonus' dividend. 
The CNR is authorized to interest itself directly or indirectly 
in other companies or in industrial, commercial or financial, operations 
39/ 
related to its purposes.— By virtue of this, it has promoted the 
formation of or contributed capital to the following: (a) the Compagnie 
Nationale pour 11 Aména^ ement de la Region du Bas Rhone et du Langusdoc, 
which is a concessionary of irrigation and land reclamation works.in the 
area of that name (the CNR holds 14 million of the 500 million francs that 
make up its capital); (b) the Compagnie Genérale de Navigation Hautes 
Pyrénées-Lyon-Mediterranée, which operates the Rhone river fleet and to 
which boats have been supplied by the CNR'; (c) the Société pour 
l!Aménagement du Rhone mentioned previously; and (d) the Groupement 
d'Etudes pour 1'Expansion Economique du Sud-Est. 
Concessionaries of electroducts holding concessions outside1the 
competence of the CNR that buy a minimum of 500,000 francs' worth of 
shares in the latter, have priority as regards the transmission and 
distribution of optional energy. 
During the first 20 years, electricity for irrigation purposes 
is given the advantage of an infinitesimally low rate (0.02 francs per 
kWh in 1934), which the consumer may use either for 4,000 consecutive 
hours (five and a half months) or permanently except for the four hours 
a day for which the CNR does not allow reduced rates. During these four 
hours and apart from the quota of 4,000 consecutive hours, ordinary 
29/ See also ST/TAA/k/7, p. 27-
/rat es are 
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rates are in force. After the first 20 years, the electricity rates 
for irrigation may not exceed half the average rate for other uses. The 
utilization of irrigation channels and pumping stations is managed by 
communities of farmers formed for this purpose* 
Lastly, for illustrative purposes, it may be added that 2,250 
million of the 12,300 million francs invested in 1956 came from the 
CNR's own income, 3,500 million were lent by the Economic and Social 
Development Fund, 2,650 million originated from a compulsory loan from 
the reserves of insurance companies and 3,900 million from medium-term 
credit operations backed by the State, 
(d) Private persons only but with governmental powers 
This type comprises the irrigation co-operatives and mutual-aid 
societies which exist in the United States, and were mentioned in 
connexion with irrigation and similar districts. 
Analogous to these are the "channel associations" in Chile.—^ 
The observation made earlier that a "district" is a type of 
administrative organization which must necessarily assist regional 
development bodies in river basin development projects is applicable to 
all such organizations. 
4• Utilization of establishments or public works 
through contracts with private companies 
The United States Government has recently begun to use this system 
of decentralized public administration ^ ^ for operating its nuclear 
research and production plants, and a contract was signed for.this purpose, 
between the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Electric and Du Pont 
companies. The Commission had to pay.a fixed sum annually to the two 
companies and assume responsibility for all operational costs. The 
efficacy of the system has been questioned, since it is difficult to make 1 
it function efficiently. Moreover it is a source of worry to the Govern-
ment, since, if one of the agreements has to be rescinded for non-fulfilment, 
the Government may find itself without trained personnel to continue 
running the plants directly. 
40/ Cano, op*cit., p. 127-





PROBLEMS OF JURISDICTION AMONG AUTHORITIES 
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS IN THE SAME COUNTRY 
As this study does not attempt to consider problems other than those 
relating to the administrative structure of water resources development 
at the regional level (by river basins), similar problems which are to be 
met with in several countries —^ and which affect the whole of their 
territory, i.e., with national implications, are not touched upon-
This chapter deals with the problems that arise from the existence 
of internal political sub-divisions (States or provinces) in certain 
federal countries• This aspect has been thought worthy of special attention 
since it is one of the principal and most frequent problems besetting 
hydraulic development programmes in those countries. 
This is not true of all federal countries. In Latin America, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela labour under this difficulty but only slightly, since 
their constitutions give the central Government jurisdiction over most waters. 
Table 2 outlines the different aspects from which the question has been 
tackled, and indicates the explanatory method to be adopted in this chapter-
Table 2 
TYPES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CO-OPERATION FOR THE REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT. OF WATER RESOURCES IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES WHERE 
WATER JURISDICTION IS DIVIDED AMONG AUTHORITIES 
•AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
1. Federal action only with participation of provinces on an advisory basis 
2. Agreements among federals-provincial organizations 
3* Legal control of water rights and separate administrative procedure 
in each State 
4- Simultaneous or parallel legislation 
5• Inter-jurisdictional agreements, treaties or compacts 
l/ Seé the ECLA study on water resources in Ecuador which is being prepared. 
With regard to Argentina, see also the Advisory Commission on Hydro- -




Argentina is the sole country in Latin America with a federal 
organization, and the United States the only one as far as the rest of 
the continent is concerned. The case of countries outside the Western 
hemisphere which find themselves in a similar situation will also be 
discussed, since the solutions they have adopted may also be useful for 
Latin America-
Federalism and the institutional problems it creates are often 
unintelligible for those who are familiar only with the experience of 
countries organized under another form of government. 
Federalism does not derive from written political constitutions but 
from historical and cultural traditions. It frequently takes the form of 
an emotional attitude against which considerations of convenience based 
on political techniques or administrative science-are powerless. Apart 
from its historical origin, federalism is also based on geographical and 
physical factors. Therefore, instead of attempting to bypass or even 
suppress it, the easiest thing to do from a purely theoretical point of 
view may be to accept it as a fact and look for solutions which, far 
from ignoring it, take it into account. 
With regard to the different solutions that, have been reviewed in 
this chapter, the best and quickest results seem to have been produced 
by interjurisdictional agreements which set up the necessary organizations 
for developing river basins that fall within more than one political 
2/ 
jurisdiction.— In several countries, this solution has only been reached 
after a long process of trial and error with other possibilities. Their 
experience may be useful to other countries which are facing the same 
problem by enabling them to eliminate much fruitless investigation. 
Wherever direct agreements are still not feasible, the next best 
solution might be to resort to parallel legislation. Although this has 
less stability than an agreement, it may achieve the same results so long 
as the principle of concurrent legislation is maintained. 
2/ Steele & Regan, op.cit., p.892, refer to a project of Senator Hannings 
of the United States with respect to the Missouri basin recommending 
the organization of an inter-ministerial federal programming commission 




1. Federal action only with the participation of 
provinces on an advisory basis 
The classic example is that of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
which is administered by a board of three directors nominated by the 
President of the United States who are responsible to him rather than to 
a ministry (or its equivalent) and in which there is no State (provincial) 
participation. This organization has been strenuously opposed, among 
other reasons, for its invasion of State powers- Its supporters assert 
3 / 
that it constitutes a new form of federal-State co-operation ^  and that 
the favourable attitude taken up towards it by the Governors of the 
States in which it operates is the best yardstick with which to form an 
opinion.—^ In accordance with one of the fundamental provisions in its 
Statute, the TVA acts in close co-operation with local Governments, 
although they take no direct part in its administration. Such co-operation 
assumes the following fonns: (a) the TVA produces and sells energy on a 
wholesale basis only since local distribution and retail sales have been 
contractually ceded to municipalities and local co-operatives; (b) in 
lieu of taxes, it pays, the State Governments sums considerably exceeding 
the revenue vjhich the latter would otherwise have received from articles 
normally subject to State taxation but that, by virtue of the TVA Act, 
are exempt;^ (c) it acts in close consultation with neighbourhood 
associations, professional organizations, trade associations and local 
universities thereby ensuring that all their members take an interest in it. 
In brief, the TVA is said to be responsible for developing the river, 
whereas the development of the valley depends on the co-operative efforts 
2/ Clapp, op * cjt•, pp. 71 and 75. 
Z¿/ Ackerman & Lewry, Procéedings of the regional technical conference on 
water resources in Asia and the Far East, op.cjt., p. 444. According 
to Roscoe Martin, op.cjt., p. 242, the seven Governors alluded to do 
not consider the TVA to -be a "super-State". 
¿/ Finer, op.cit., p.145- According to section 145 of the TVA Act, 5 
per cent of the gross income from sales of energy produced at the plants 
in Alabama and Tennessee is handed over to the State Governments 




of official, bodies and local communities* The TVA's main activities 
are afforestation, electricity distribution, local flood control, 
regional social and economic research and the development of local valleys-
They have led to an improvement in the economic status of the people and 
a considerable expansion in the activities of local Governments, which, 
far from restricting their field of action, have considerably widened it 
and simultaneously, added to their income- One specific form of co-operation 
consists of loans for development purposes which the TVA makes (for 
example, to municipalities) to finance electricity grids 
The Corporación del Cauca is also exclusively federal- Its board 
of directors consists of seven members (four being designated by the 
President of the Republic and the other three being ex officio Governors 
of the departments of Caldas, Cauca and Valle del Cauca who are also 
appointed by the President). Local Governments help to finance the 
Corporación, since, while the federal Government pays for the power 
station at Colima and its transmission line, provincial Governments 
contribute their revenue from territorial land taxes, improvement taxes 
7/ 
and certain rates 
The Comissao do Vale do.SSo- Francisco, which is also exclusively 
federal, is composed of representatives (without the right of vote) 
from the State Governments of Minas Gerais, Bahía, Pernambuco, Alagoas 
and Sergipe (Federal Act 541, article 13). 
Bondholders that have contributed to the loan used to finance the 
Chambal Valley Project in India have the right to elect representatives 8/ 
with the right of vote to the control board in charge of the work.-' 
It has also been suggested that control boards composed of represent-
atives of the Government and general public might be established in this 9 / type of organization,-' but those who have studied the TVA set-up object 
6/ K.K. Sinha, op-cit., p.'438. 
2/ CVC-A regional program, op.cit.f p. 21; Estatutos de la CVC, article 25 
8/ Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water resources 
development in Asia and the Far East, op.cit -, p.434-
9/ Gunasekera, Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water 
resources development in Asia and the Far East, op*cit., p. 48-
/to such 
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to such an innovation unless the board is to be of a purely advisory 
nature-"Nevertheless, advisory boards are considered to be advantageous, 
since the'support of public opinion in the neighbourhood for a regional 
authority is believed to be an all-important factor in the success of a 
regional. programme^ 
In Argentina, the river Bermejo treaty (awaiting ratification) does 
not make clear line of demarcation in this field- According to the treaty, 
the agency which would build and manage the basic works would be exclusively 
federal as would be the funds for financing it - However, as regards 
irrigation, for example, the construction of secondary distribution 
channels and' their administration would be in the harids of the provincial 
Governments- Similarly, hydroelectric plants and transmission lines, 
whether international or interprovincial, would be under federal juris-
diction, although local grids would be set up and operated by the 
provinces concerned. 
2. Agreements among federal-provincial organizations 
Those examined here are administrative agreements with no legal 
status. Agreements with force of law will be studied in section 5* 
U / 
Shih ;— points out that one type of interstate organization consists 
of agreements among agencies even though they may have <no'provision for 
Federal participation. An example of this kind is the Interstate-Commission 
on the Delavrare River Basin, which was established by agreement among 
the Departments of Public Health in the States of Delaware, New Jersey, 
New York and Pennsylvania. Its sole functions are those of programming 
and advising. It may also propose regulations for adoption, but each 
State makes its own legislation in this respect and is responsible for 
seeing that the laws are enforced. 
In the United States, an agreement was concluded among federal 12/ organizations in 1954 and ratified by the President;—' this made 
10/ Finer, op-cit., p-118- / 
11/ Shih, op.citVol. 2, p-1006-
12/ "Interagency agreement on co-ordination of water and related land 





provision for all federal organizations to., co-ordinate their policies, 
programmes and activities in the field of water resources, and was 
endorsed by the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Trade, Health and 
Defense and" by the President' of the Federal Electricity Commission. The 
agreement sets up a committee on which the organizations concerned must 
be represented by an official who is not lower than an Assistant Secretary 
in rank- In addition, chapter 6 provides for the establishment of local 
committees of the samé types, with the optional participation of provincial 
Government representatives,'who must act in co-ordination with the main 
committee. The latter is empowered to draw up the charters or statutes 
of the local committees and to approve their regulations- By virtue of 
the above-mentioned provisions, the following local committees have been 
organized (by river basins): (!) Missouri, (2) Columbia, (3) Pacific 
Southwest, (4) Arkansas-White fíed and (5) New England-New York. These 
are programming and co-ordinating bodies only. The execution and 
administration of the projects is the responsibility of the organizations 
represented on the committees- Recommendations made by local Governments 
are not binding. The charter of'the Columbia Basin Inter-agency Committee, 
for .instance, grants representation, to the federal organizations already 
mentioned and to the States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, 
Utah and Nevada, all of which form part of the Columbia river basin. 
It states that the Governors óf these States will be "invited" to 
participate, but that they may delegate their powers of representation. 
Other provincial bodies may be invited to' form sub-committees or to 
attend Committee meetings- The Chairman of the Committee is elected by 
the federal members only. One of the aims of the Committee is to. promote 
co-ordination of the federal and provincial organizations1 activities at 
the regional level and to recommend to the States any changes,in legis-
lation or policy that might be required to co-ordinate and solve problems 
among the agencies. . . 




The efficacy of these organizations is praised by s o m e — a n d 
] 5 / 
denied by others.-^' In any case, they are merely allowed to act as 
programming and co-ordinating bodies and never have any executive functions, 
which would have to be bestowed by formal inter-governmental agreements 
(treaties or compacts). The latter factor is precisely what leads to 
doubts as regards their efficiency, since their usefulness is limited to 
the different stages of programming and may not be extended to those of 
execution and administration - or they may simply be considered as 
preliminary steps towards formal legislative agreements. 
3. Legal control of water rights and separate 
administrative procedure in each State 
In some federal countries inter-State disputes have been referred 
to the courts for settlement. . The latter may give a ruling only in so . 
far as regulations are concerned, since their faculties are limited to. 
distributing water to each State and its inhabitants and supervising this 
distribution, and they can neither establish organizations nor stipulate 
the administrative procedure for carrying out.the regulations. However, 
they have proved an important source of progress, since, in putting an 
end to the disputes-which impeded or disrupted,the. use of interprovincial 
water resources, they enabled such resources to be employed more extensively. 
The Indian Interstates Water Disputes Act of 1956 lays down the 
procedure to be adopted in settling such disputes- ..A judge or. former 
judge of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal is to be chosen as arbiter, 
and his ruling is final. Arbiters of this kind settle interstate disputes 
only and do not hear private cases. The central Government may establish 
the general procedure to be followed in trying a case, after consultation 
with the provincial Governments. Disputes between States which have 
14/ Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future, Proceedings, 
Washington, 1953, section III, p.8; Gunasekera, Proceedings of the 
regional technical conference on water resources development in Asia 
and the Far East, op*cit., p. 4 8 . 




already set up boards for the administration of.int^rprovincial rivers 
are excluded from this procedure and instead come under.,the Rivers Board 
Act of 1956 which will be studied later and which establishes an arbitration 
procedure.^' . . 
In the United States, the rulings of the Supreme Court have, since 
.1901, -pave,d the way for the use of interprovincial rivers, since it was 
only after the settlement of numerous disputes that the practice of 
direct inter-State compacts was instituted. (See the United States 
Government publication which contains the principal rulings given in 
this field.) Some earlier decisions (1852) refer to navigation only. 
The jurisprudence in this field has been classified according to two 
typés of lawsuit': (a) those between private persons in different States, 
18/ 
in which it was decided — ' that the allocation of water for different 
uses should be determined by the principle-of priority and that it should 
apply between two persons even when they lived in different States; 
(b) those betweén States, in which the principle of the equitable-19 / distribution of wáter was laid down.-^7 (See the interesting analysis 
20 / 
which Richard Witmer has made of all this jurisprudence.)—' It may also 
'be observed that it was the United States Supreme Court itself which, in 
its rulings, commended the procedure of interprovincial treaties as being 
preferable to that of the distribution of water resources according to 
legislation. 
The Swiss.federal tribunal has also ruled on inter-cantonal water distribution. 
16/ Multiple-purpose river basin development, Part 2B Water resource 
development in Burma, India and Pakistan, Flood control series N° 11, 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 1956.II.F.8, Bangkok, December 
1956, p.71. 
12/ United States Department of the Interior, Documents on the use and 
control of the waters of interstate and international streams, 
compiled by Richard Witmer, Washington, 1956, pp. 457-733* 
18/ Bean v- Morris, 221 US 485, 1911. 
19/ Kansas v. Colorado, 185 US 125, 19.02; 206 US 4 6 , 19Q7- . 
20/ Richard Witmer, The interstate compact and a permanent irrigation 
agriculture, presented to the First Intersociety Conference on 
Irrigation and Drainage, San Francisco, California, April 1957-




The solution contemplated here, although useful and. effective,ris 
incomplete since it only deals with the. framing of regulations, or, in 
other, words, with the aggregate distribution or .sharing of water among 
the different States or provinces concerned and does not góvern the 
relations between Governments and users nor the organization and operation 
of the agencies which;build.and manage the works, supply the requirements 
of the public or carry on industrial or commercial activities. 
4* Concurrent or parallel legislation 
The principal commentators on the system of administration for inter-
22/ 
State rivers in the United States — ' point out that joint, concurrent or 
parallel legislation is one of the forms that such administration may take. 
Since all inter provincial compacts in the United States have to be 
approved by Congress, this type of legislation has been used for matters 
the importance of which is not considered sufficient to require the 
consent of Congress and which therefore escape all the tedious negotiations 
attendant upon such consent. It has also been used for setting up non-
contractual systems from which it is easy to secede since they involve no 
bilateral obligations and each of the participating States may revoke or 
amend its concurrent legislation unilaterally without the others lodging 
a complaint. There are various ways of applying this system. "• 23 / 
Thus, the States of New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania — 
enacted identical and simultaneous legislation on the Delaware river 
basin to govern the use of the Delaware's waters within their territories 
for municipal and domestic purposes- The relevant permits are issued by 
the water-control organizations in each State. But recommendations' 
affecting the common interest of all the States may be presented to the 
inter-State commission of the river Delaware, which is composed of 
representatives of the above-mentioned States. The commission may also 
undertake research in the common interest. Each such Act contains a 
22/ Witmer, op.cit., p.2; Shih, op.cit., Vol-2, p-1006-
23/ New Jersey Laws, 1944, P-328; New York Laws, 1943, P-1457; Pennsylvania 





provision suspending its entry into effect until the secretary of the 
respective State has certified that the other two have also enacted 
identical legislation. 
Similarly, New Hampshire and Vennont, in 1946, enacted parallel 
legislation for the river Connecticut which obliged private persons 
wishing to use the Connecticut's waters to obtain permission from the 
2 4 / 
Attorney General of each State.— 
South Dakota and Minnesota took a further step forward drafting 
concurrent legislation creating the Boundary Water Commission in 1939 
to deal with the waters of Big Stone Lake. The commission is presided 
over by an engineer - nominated by joint agreement between the Governors 
of both State - and consists of the Director of Conservation, Fisheries 
and Hunting in South Dakota and the Commissioner for Conservation in 
Minnesota. The commission may draw up regulations, but must call upon 
the local courts in the respective States to enforce them-
Before the conclusion in 1937 of the treaty between New York and 
New Jersey setting up the Palisades Interstate Park Commission, these 
States had each designated their own administrative commission for their 
respective part of the park, in conformity with their own legislation, 
but both had nominated the same persons commissioners. Thus, in actual 
fact, the two separate commissions consisted of the same persons-^/ 
States which are parties to treaties often provide for expansion 
or amendment by means of parallel legislation, for example, New York and 2 7 / New Jersey in the case of the Port of New York Authority.—' The signatory 
28/ 
States of the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Compact — h a v e agreed, on 
the other hand, to adopt the recommendations of the inter-State commission 
constituted by the Compact itself and also to increase its powers. 
24/ New Hampshire Laws, 1946, ch. 268; Vermont Laws, 1946, N° 16. 
25/ Minnesota Laws, 1939, ch. 60; South Dakota Laws, 1939, ch. 294-
26/ Shih, 0£1cit., Vol. 2, p.1228. 
27/ In 1947, it was empowered to build and administer airports - New York 
Laws, 1947, ch. 802; New Jersey Laws, 1947, ch. 43-
28/ United States Public Law.N° 66 (81st Congress), chs. IX and X. 
/5. Int erjurisdict ional 
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5. Interjurisdictional agreements, treaties and compacts 
(a) Countries in which they are used 
This is one form which Argentina, Australia, India, Switzerland and 
the United States have adopted to solve the problems of water distribution 
and jurisdiction over interprovincial rivers. Owing to its nature, it 
is suitable for use by federal countries only. It should be remembered, 
however, that at the beginning of this chapter, it was stated that in 
-some federal countries - for example, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela - the 
constitution has conferred upon the federal Government the responsibility 
for managing water and energy resources, and that the problem of super-
imposed jurisdictions therefore does not arise. 
In the newly-emancipated Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, 
where water resources are overwhelmingly important from the economic point 
of view, there is a tendency to leave their administration to provincial 
Governments. Thus, the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan empowers these 
Governments to control the use of waters, manage supplies for municipal-
ities and look after irrigation, drainage, flood control, water storage, 
29/ 
hydroelectricity, anti-pollution measures, fisheries and navigation.— 
Much the same occurred in India, as will be seen later. 
In federal countries where the provincial Governments have 
jurisdiction over the waters, integrated river basin development programmes 
are, as already stated, faced with a dual problem: (1) how to reconcile 
the powers of the Governments of the different political jurisdictions in 
one and the same country with a view to the joint management of a river 
basin and the adoption of only one programme; and (2) how to choose the 
best type of administrative organization for this purpose. Inter-State 
agreements combined with a system of autonomous valley organizations have 
proved to be a success in Australia, India and the United States. - The 
Australian RMC and Indian DVC are both examples of this type of multi-
purpose organization which have fulfilled their aims and carried out 
works of great importance. There are many more examples to be found in 




the United States, but all are of less importance since the two outstanding 
regional development programmes undertaken there (TVA and Columbia Basin 
programmes) were the. responsibility of the federal Government alone* 
According.to some United States commentators, the system involved 
in this combination is efficacious only in so far as inter-State water 
distribution or problems of water pollution are concerned which require 
the drafting of regulations rather than the execution of large-scale 
projects.*^' The TVA experts also impugn its effectiveness, on the 
grounds that inter-State authorities in the United States have undertaken 
31/ 
single-purpose projects rather than integrated development programmes.— 
Some Asian specialists are also critical of the system. For 
instance, they consider that the DVC's failure to become more efficient 32/ 
arises from the fact that it has to satisfy not one master but several.— 
All the same, it must be observed that: (1) both, the DVC and RMC have 
striking achievements to. their credit; (2) difficulties in India derive 
mainly from the fact that its political divisions are, generally speaking, 
founded on differences of race, religion or tongue which, by interposing 
emotional factors, make interprovincial relations more difficult. 
A survey will next be made by countries in order to see how the 
system has been applied and what results have been obtained, 
(b) Argentina 
After 1955, Argentina began the practice of interprovincial 
agreements for rivers flowing through more than one province. They 3 3 / include the following:—' 
30/ Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future, Proceedings, 
Washington, 1953, section III, p.8-
31/ Ackerman and Lewry, op.cjt., p. 439. 
32/ K-K. Sinha, op.cjt., p.435; A.D. Gorwala, Report on efficient conduct 
of state enterprises, p.33* 
33/ From September 1955 to May 1958, when the interprovincial agreements 
cited above were concluded, Argentina was ruled by a de facto Govern-
ment . Some sectors questioned the right of interprovincial authorities 
to subscribe to such agreements, and as a result a few of them may 
have to be ratified anew or may be allowed to lapse. See Guillermo J. 
Cano, Treaties and compacts between the political divisions of federal 
countries as sources of international water law, presented to the 48th 
Conference of the International Law Association, New York, 1958. 
/(I) River 
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(1) River Colorado. On 29 August 1956, the provinces of Buenos 
Aires, La Pampa, Mendoza, Neuquén and Río Negro set up an 
interprovincial organization in which the federal Government 
was not to participate. This is already in operation and its 
objectives are to programme the development of the resources 
of the basin and project the distribution of its water among 
the riparian provinces. 
(2) Organización interprovincial del agua del Noroeste Argentino 
(OIANA). The provinces of Catamarca, Formosa, Jujuy, Salta, 
Santiago del Estero and Tucumán founded this organization on 
14 December 1956 for the purpose of studying problems of 
regional water resources development. Its jurisdiction is not 
limited to any particular basin, but covers several small 
comparable areas. 
(3) River Berme.io. This river is also international (with Bolivia). 
The Argentine Government established a federal commission 
to study, project, and invite tenders for, development works 
(navigation and irrigation channels, hidroelectric plants and 
dams for regulating the rate of flow). At the same time, the 
provinces concerned (Chaco., Formosa, Jujuy, Salta, Santiago del 
Estero and Santa Fe) and the federal commission signed a treaty 
on 31 January 1958 for the development of the river Bermejo, 
which provided for the participation of the federal Government 
and for the establishment of an unspecified administrative 
organization to manage the works. Prior to this, another 
similar instrument was passed but never actually enforced as 
3 5 / 
xt lacked the requisite number of ratifications.— The 
Bolivian Government has been notified of the Argentine 
34/ Act 4962 of 14 May 1957* In article 5, the provinces concerned are 
invited to nominate delegates without the right to vote. 
31/ Memoria del Congreso sobre el Canal del Río Bermejo, Resistencia, 
1957, official edition by the Chaco Government, p.267- See also 
J.A. Martínez de Hoz, "El petróleo y las fuentes naturales de energía 
frente a la reforma de la Constitución". Diario de Jurisprudencia 




Government's projects, bub has never signed any treaty 
in this respect. 
(4) Ríos Albinasta and Guayamba- The provinces of Catamarca 
and Santiago del Estero concluded an.agreement on 1.November 
1957 for the joint utilization of the above-mentioned rivers, 
setting up for this purpose a special interprovincial agency 
- the Comisión In'serprovincial del Agua de Catamarca y Santiago 
del Estero (CIACSE) - -which is in operation. 
(5) Rio Negro- The provincial Governments of Chubut, Neuquén 
and Rio Negro signed a treaty with the federal Government 
creating the Corporación Norpatagcnica, which was approved 
on 17 December 1957- As it was signed by de facto Governments, 
provision was made for subsequent ratification by the de jure 
legislative authorities which took office on 1 May 1958-
Ratification was refused, but the same Governments announced 
soon after that they had agreed upon new principles for the 
creation of a Unión Económica de la Patagonia (UNEPA) which, 
inter alia, would be responsible for developing the basin of 
the river Negro (iriterprovincial). 
(c) Australia 
The problem of the rivers Murray and Dumar'esq-Barwon Border was 
solved in the same way; some brief information will be given on this 
point in the annex to the report. 
(d) United States 
Its experience is very vast. In order to demonstrate this, it has 
been thought worth while to list some of the more important United States 





INTER-STATE TREATIES (COMPACTS) CONCLUDED IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN RESPECT OF INTER-STATE RIVERS 
Year River Year River Year River 
1922 Colorado 1939 Potomac 1948 Upper Colorado 
1922 Plate 1942 Republican 1949 Snake 
1923 South Platte 1943 Belle Fourche 1950 Canadian 
1935 Port of New York 1944 Costilla Creek 1950 Yellowstone 
1937 Red of the North 1947 New England 1951 Connecticut 
1938 Rio Grande 1948 Arkansas 1953 Sabine 
1939 Ohio 1948 Pecos 1958 Bear 
There are also other treaties on navigation (Kentucky-Virginia), 
recreation (Pennsylvania-Ohio with respect to Lake Pymatuning), and river 
boundaries or fisheries which have been omitted from table 3, since this 
includes only those treaties that refer primarily to the agricultural use 
of water- The annex mentions several other compacts which are classified 
according to their objectives* 
Before the theory underlying compacts is reviewed in general, it 
would be as well to note that the magistrate of one of the States in the 
United States ruled that it was unconstitutional to employ the funds of 
State Governments for inter-State administrations; this ruling was later 
rejected by the Supreme Federal Court*—^ 
Richard Witmer, who will be used as a guide for these summary remarks 
on the compact theory, points out that, in order to be effective, compacts 
must fulfil three conditions:—^ (1) they must reconcile territorial 
political boundaries with natural boundaries; (2) they must be based on 
the principle that those who are intended to benefit from them are 
36/ West Virginia v. Sims, 341, US 22 and 30, 1951-




individuals rather than Governments; and (3) they must be flexible as 
to the type of administration to be adopted and admit the possibility 
of subsequent amendment. 
With regard to the last point, it should be noted that -when the 
Supreme Court has ruled on disputes, it always allows for the possibility 
that its decisions may be reviewed and rectified if the basic facts of 
the case change. The "facts" of course embody more than the physical 
aspects. Technical progress in water utilization may lead to new uses 
or different forms of utilization which would alter the basic facts in 
so far as the equitable distribution of benefits between two or more 
States is concerned. Witmer considers the immutability of many compacts 
to be a defect, firstly, because it prevents them from being amended 
even though the facts of the case may change, and, secondly, because it 
is apt to deter State Governments from resorting to them for fear of 
committing themselves sine die to solutions that might prove unsatis-
factory in the light of subsequent experience. The United States Congress 
itself appears to be of the same opinion, since it recently made it 
customary, in cases that require its consent, for a clause to be inserted 
by which its consent may be retracted whenever necessary to enable a 
compact to be amended. The latest treaty of this type, referring to the 
river Bear, which was signed in 1958, provides (section XIII) for 
revision of the treaty every 20 years. It is very unusual, however, 
for any provision to be made for unilateral denunciation.^^ 
As regards the "objects" or consumers, there are two general types 
of compact in the United States: those which distribute water among the 
different States as the Upper Colorado river compact, and those which 
concern individual users and the way in which they exercise their rights, 
as the Little Snake, Costilla Creek and Bear river compacts. . .  
There are four varieties of compact for the administration of the 
different rivers: (1) those which do not provide for or create any 
38/ The'Gulf States Marines Fisheries Compact of 1949 provides (section 
XIV) that it may be denounced by State law with effect from six 




organization whatsoever, such as the Colorado and So.uth Platte river , 
compacts; (2) those which delegate responsibility for the implementation 
of their provisions and for water management, within the respective 
State boundaries, to the ordinary authorities in each State, i-e. without 
creating any special organization, although the administrative procedure 
to be followed is laid down, as in the cases of the Belle Fourche, 
Costilla Creek, Plate, Republican and Snake river compacts; (3) those 
which set up special organizations, but limit their competence to the 
measurement of water, as the Canadian river and Rio Grande compacts; 
and (4) those which establish special organizations with wide powers. 
39/ 
Examples of the last category are the Sabine River Compact,—' which has 
set up a commission to record and authorize the points and methods of 
water diversion; the Bear River. Compact, which has set up a commission 
that may decide how water distribution is to be carried out in times of 
drought; and the New York Harbor Pollution Control Compact, which has . 
established a commission to execute its orders directly.^^ 
It is recommended that officials in interprovincial organizations 
should have direct authority over users.—^ Nevertheless, most of the 
United States treaties only authorize such organizations to seek judicial 
enforcement for their orders, if those to whom they.are issued are 42/ 
unwilling to carry them o u t J 
(e) . India 
India has followed the same procedure in regard to the Damodar, 
Bhakra, Tungabadhra and Hirakud rivers, as may be seen from the annex. 
The way in which inter-State river control boards are to be organized is 
laid down in the River Boards Act (N° 49 of 1956), which is of a general 
nature. Its main provisions are as follows: 
39/ 68 Stat. 690, section III. 
40/ 49 Stat. 932, sections X and XI. 
41/ Witmer, op.cit., p. 5 . 
42/ For instance, the South Dakota Commission, Bear River Commission 
(section III D), Connecticut Commission (section XI), Ohio River 




(1) The boards may regulate water distribution and supervise 
development projects for inter-State rivers and valleys; 
(2) Boards are set up at the request of the States or by order 
of the central Government, but in the latter case, the States 
are consulted beforehand and should express their views on the 
formation of the board, its directors and its terms of reference; 
(3) The boards have their own juridical and administrative person-
ality, may have their own property and may plead their own 
cases in court; 
(4) The tributaries of the respective principal rivers come'under 
the jurisdiction of the corresponding boards; 
(5) Boards consist of a chairman and as many members (all technical 
experts) as the central Government sees fit to appoint; in 
setting up a board the Government must also define its 
organization and rules of procedure* JO / 
(6) The boards may nominate advisory committees — and bring in 
new members, who, however, may not vote; 
(7) The functions of the boards are to undertake studies, prepare 
projects, make recommendations as to the distribution of costs 
and benefits among the. respective member Governments arid advise 
the latter in their construction worka. They must consult 
member Governments at all stages "of their activities, and try 
to establish agreement among them. They may inspect the works 
constructed by the Governments arid ask for reports on them. 
(8) The boards are financed by contributions from the central 
Government and State Governments. In one case, that of the 
Hirakud Control Board, the central Government provides all 
the funds but in the shape of a loan to the State of Orisa, 
which acts through its delegation forming part of the board 
together with members of both Governments-
43/.The Hirakud Control Board has a development board (for all matters 
concerned with lánd purchases, the settlement of displaced persons, 




(9) The boards have to submit annual reports to the central 
Parliament, and State Governments on their activities and 
present their accounts for auditing, which is carried out 
as stipulated in each. case*. 
. . (10) Any disputes that arise are to. be settled by an arbiter 
appointed from among the magistrates and ex-magistrates by 
the President of the Supreme Court. 
(11) Board-officials are considered as belonging to.the public 
administration for the purpose of their penal responsibility 
and the boards may confer upon them some of their own powers. 
(12) The central Government is responsible for the formulation of 
the Act and the boards for their own rules of. procedure* 
It should be pointed out that the Government of India Act of 1935 
drawn up under United, Kingdom administration empowered State Governments 
to manage irrigation and hydroelectricity production. If conflicts arose 
among them over inter-State rivers, the central Government, intervened by 
appointing a commission-to prepare a report on which it would use as a 
basis for; its ruling. After India became independent, the State Govern-
ments retained their powers and attempts to transfer full powers of 
river management to the central Government have so far been unsuccessful.-
The Damodar Valley Authority, has its own Act which confers much 
wider powers upon it than those deriving from the River Boards Act. The 
latter governs all the Control Boards listed in the annex. 
(f) Switzerland 
Switzerland's experience goes back to 1841, when the cantons of 
Zurich and Schwyz regulated the use of the river Sihl in this way.^/ 
(g) Attempt to systematize the principles governing interjurisdictional 
organizations 
There is no question here of embarking upon an exhaustive analysis of 
44/ Proceedings of the regional technical conference for water resources 
development in Asia and the Far East, op.cit., p . 246; Multiple-
purpose river basin development, op.cit., p. 71. 




the principles that govern organizations created by interprovincial or 
inter-State agreements - which would fill-a large volume - but. of cursorily-
reviewing their general trends. 
(i) Juridical personality- Many agreements create organizations 
with their own juridical and political personality (corporate and politic 
bodies) which must function as. Government "instrumentalities" and 
may act under both public and private law- Some of these organizations 
have had State governmental ppwers expressly conferred upon them, i-e-
in j 
they act in the name of the Governments-^ The latter may therefore 
modify the terms of reference of an inter-State organization unilaterally, 
though the amendments will be valid only within the territory of the 
State concerned. 
The fact that such organizations are exempt from the need to comply 
with the individual legislation of their member States - as regards 
contracts or staff recruitment, for instance - and are subject instead to 
their own statutes brings out even more distinctly the powers that are jg/ conferred by the possession of a juridical personality.—' 
(ii) Authorities. The directors or commissioners aré usually elected 
U 9 / in conformity with the laws of the State that they represent,—' and in 
the United States, the chairman is often a representative of thé President, 
50/ 
without the right of vote-— It is normally required that they should 
be citizens with the right to vote who are residents in the organization's 
4 6 / Bi-State Commission (section-III), Canadian Commission (section IX), 
Delaware Port Authority (section I), Palisades Commission (section II), 
Breaks Commission (section II), Damodar (DVA)-. 
47/ Palisades Comm. (section III), Bhakra Board. 
48/ Comisión Interprovincial del Agua de Catamarcay Santiago, del Estero 
(CIACSE), Argentina. Agreement of 1 November 1957, article III; river 
Bermejo treaty (unratified) of 30 November 1956, article 4; Canadian 
Commission (section IX(b)); Potomac Comm.(section I). 
1 
49/ IEMC; Dumaresq Commission; Bi-State Commission (section III); Canadian 
. Commission, (section IX); DVC. 
¿0/ Yellowstone Commission; Bear River Commission (section III); Ohio 
Commission (section IX); Potomac Commission (section I)-
/jurisdict ion. Certain 
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jurisdiction. Certain officials, who possess specialized khowleQge, are 
51/ often made ex officio members.—7 
The principle of unanimity for decisions to be valid is laid down 
c¡2/ 
in numerous agreements —' although in others a majority vote is deemed 
sufficient (DVC). 
When each party to an agreement is represented by several members, 
agreements require not only a majority vote on the part of all the 53/ 
delegations but also that there shall be a quorum in each delegation.— 
Other agreements insist upon a total quorum.—^ 
Some reserve for the Governors of the member States the right of 5 5 / 
veto with respect to important activities.^ -
The responsibilities of the organizations' officials are placed 
on á comparable level with those of State employees in certain agreements 
and with those of private companies in others. 
(iii) Terms of reference. See the analysis of the terms of reference 
of United States organizations earlier on. Some merely establish 
regulations, and have no executive activities- Nearly all have jus 
edicendi, i.e., they may draw up regulations which are binding on all 56/ 
the inhabitants within their jurisdictions.—' In exceptional cases, 
they have the imperium, or, in other words, the power to ensure that their own-orders are carried out, although the majority are obliged to 
57/ request enforcement of their orders by the judiciary. 
51/ Tungabadhra Board; New England Commission (section III); Gulf States 
Commission (section III). 
52/ Comisión Interprovincial del Agua de Catamarca y Santiago del Estero 
(CIACSE), Regulations., article 5j RMC; Bi-State Commission, Canadian 
Commission (section IX). 
53/ CIACSE, Regulations, article 5J Bi-Staté Commission (section V). 
54/ RMC, except for questions of procedure; Canadian Commission (section IX) 
55/ Bi-State Commission (section V); New York Port Authority. 
56/ DVC; Costilla Creek Commission (section VIII).. 




Nearly all organizations may appear in court as plaintiff or defendant, 
by virtue of possessing juridical personality. Many have direct rights of 
expropriation, while others have to request the Governments concerned to 
expropriate on their behalf- One is expressly authorized to spend funds 
abroad. Another is empowered to give orders not only to private persons, 
but to State organizations and municipalities- In a few cases, inter-
State or interprovincial commissions may set up their own pension funds 
for their staff 
(iv) Territorial jurisdiction- This generally comprises not only 
rivers, but river basins and valleys. In some cases, tributaries have 
59 / 
also been explicitly included-—' 
(v) Control by member Governments- Political control is exercised 
in a great variety of ways. Ackerman and Lewry consider it desirable 
that an organization should not be obliged to undertake certain activities 
for motive.s of political convenience. The decisions of the Indian River 
Control Boards are subject to ratification by the member States, which 
implies a maximum degree of political control. In the case of the DVC, 
the central Government may give instructions on policy, which thereafter 
have to be carried out. In other cases, particularly in the United 
States, organizations have,full autonomy; this is even one of the conditions 
attaching to their establishment in order to ensure impartial action on 
their part. 
The auditing of expenditure accounts is sometimes left to the 
accounting offices of the member States and sometimes to qualified 
independent public accountants — ^ independently of the accountancy 
legislation of the States or provinces. 
(vi) Privileges.- Such organisations are usually exempt from payment 
of rates and taxes, but frequently have to make payments in lieu of taxes 
which are agreed upon contractually and replace the revenue that,the 
58/ Gal Oya.Board, Rules, fll-25*-
59/ India, The River Boards Act, section 4, para. 4; New England Commission 
(section I); Canadian Commission (section II). 




member States cease to receive following the transfer of part of their 
6l/ 
powers to these organizations.— The' DVC has to pay federal income tax 
•in the same way as any private person. Some commissions are authorized 
to request exemptions from the federal Government when the latter is in 
a position to grant them. 
(vii) Relations with member States, especially in regard to finance. 
Some treaties make provision for the accession of new member Governments* 
A number of them lay down that any dispute that arises in connexion 6 2 / 
with the implementation of the treaties is to be settled by arbitration.-—/ 
The financial commitments of the members take on very diverse forms-
Investment in the DVC (which comprises the central Government and two 
States) for the purpose of energy production is, for example, divided 
inbo equal shares; as regards irrigation, each State pays only that portion 
of investment from which it will derive benefit, and if the same invest-
ment is to serve more than one State, each contributes an amount proportion-
ate to the quantity of water which has been guaranteed for distribution 
to it; with respect to investment for flood control, the federal Government 
and only one State bear half the costs each up to a fixed limit, beyond 
which the State Government assumes the entire responsibility; study, 
projection and administrative costs are divided into three equal parts. 
Interest is guaranteed on governmental contributions and is charged 
against overhead. 
In the RMC, which is composed of three States and the central 
Australian Government, a quarter of the construction investment and 
administrative costs is paid by each Government and a third of the 
maintenance costs.by each of the provincial Governments. 
In the Argentine CIACSE, study and projection costs are paid in 
equal proportions, by the members. Construction and execution costs are 
charged in proportion to .the benefits that each province expects to receive. 
61/ Delaware Port Authority (section XI). 
62/ DVC; RMC: in this agreement, the arbiter is nominated by the Chief 
Justice of the Tasmanian Supreme Court (another State) since the 
central Government, being one of the contracting parties, may be 




Some United States treaties fix ceiling quotas for each State's 
contributions which vary according.to the magnitude of the interests 
involved. Thus, the New England Interstate Water Pollution Control 
Compact has allocated the following quotas in dollars: Massachusetts, 
6,500, Connecticut, 3*000, Rhode Island, 1,500 and the others 1,000 each. 
The river Potomac treaty establishes the contributions on the basis 
of various indices: (1) population; (2) the scale of industrial water 
pollution and of that arising from the urban use of water in each State; 
(3) plus a basic standard rate for all. No State may pay more than 
30,000 dollars a year for all items. 
Nearly all the United States agreements contain a clause providing 
that inter-State organizations may not compromise the individual credit 
of signatory States. However, many of them authorize these organizations 
to issue bonds or other securities which involve only the organizations 
themselves• 
In other cases, the States must vote their contributions annually 
when so requested by the organizations and the latter may not compromise 
themselves financially until such contributions have been paid to them. 
The salaries of the commissioners representing the States are 
generally paid directly by the latter to ensure their independence. But 
the inter-State agencies are often authorized to pay their expenses for 
travel, etc. 
(viii) Miscellaneous. Many United States compacts contain a provision 
to the effect that, if one of their regulations is declared unconstitution-/o J 
al, the rest remain in force 





MAIN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE 
UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
Symbols or 
abbreviations 
I. ORGANIZATIONS ESTABLISHED BY MORE THAN ONE POLITICAL 
BODY (INTERSTATE OR INTERPROVINCIAL) l/ 
(a) AUSTRALIA 
1. River Murray Commission (States of New South Wales, RMC 
Victoria and South Australia and the central 
Government). Purposes: navigation, electricity, 
irrigation. Terms of reference: planning and 
drawing-up of regulations and administrative rules 
but not construction. It has no juridical 
personality or contractual powers- 2/ 
2. Dumaresq-Barwon Border Rivers Commission Dumaresq 
(States of Queensland and New South Waies). 
Created in 1947 by an inter-State agreement. 
Purposes: conservation, irrigation and community 
supply. Terms of reference: supervision and 
construction. 3/ 
(b) UNITED STATES 
(i) Multi-purpose organizations 
3• South Dakota-Minnesota Boundary Water Commission S.Dakota Comm. 
(States of"South Dakota and Minnesota). Created 
in 1939 by joint legislation in both States. 
1/ Several international organizations which are outside the scope of this 
study have not been included. 
2/ See Commonwealth of Australia, The river Murray water agreement, Canberra, 
19575 with the text of the Treaty of 9~September 1914 and the reforms of 
1923, 1934* 1948 and 1954; also RMC, the work of the river Murray Commission 
Melbourne, 1955 and the River Murray Commission, "The development of 
control of the waters of the river Murray under the River Murray Agreement", 
Proceedings, of the Regional Technical Conference on Water Resources 
Development in Asia and the Far East, Flood Control Series N° 9• United 
Nations publication, Sales~N°: 1956.*II-F.3, Bangkok, 1956, p.422-
2/ K-A. Murley, "Organization for the development of water resources in 
Australia", Proceedings of the Regional Technical Conference on Water 






Purposes: conservation, recreation and flood control. 
Terms of reference: drawing-up of regulations, 
administration and construction. 4 / 
4 . Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-
Illinois (Metropolitan District (States of Missouri 
and Illinois). Created by the Treaty of 31 August 
1950. Purposes: the development of the city of 
St - Louis (Missouri) and of the neighbouring 
counties in the State of Illinois. Terms of 
reference: the construction of bridges, under-
water tunnels, airports, sewage, rain drainage 
and drinking water systems. It has political 
and juridical personality. ¿/ 
5- Canadian River Commission (States of Oklahoma, 
Texas and New Mexico). Created by the Treaty of 
17 May 1952. Purposes: to measure and distribute 
waters among the States. Terras of reference: 
drawing-up of regulations and administration.6/ 
6. Yellowstone River Commlssion (States of Montana 
and Wyoming)"! Created by the Treaty of 30 
October 1951 between the above-mentioned States 
and that of North Dakota. Purposes and terms of 
reference: similar to those of the Canadian 
Commission. It has juridical personality.7/ 
(ii) Organizations for irrigation 
Bear River Commission (States of Idaho, Utah and 
Wyoming). Created by the Treaty of 17 March 1958. 
Purposes: to measure and distribute water among 
the States and their individual irrigators. 
Terms of reference: drawing-up of regulations 
and administration. It has juridical personality.8/ 
8. Costilla Creek Compact Commission 
(States of Colorado and New Mexico). 





Bear River Comm. 
Costilla Comm 
4/ Minnesota Laws of 1939, ch.60; South Dakota Laws of 1939, ch. 294; Shih, 
op.cit., Vol-2, pp.1008 and, 1227-
¿/ United States Congress Public Law N° 743, 1950-
6/ 66 Stat. 74* 
7/ 65 Stat. 6 6 3 . 






Purposes: integrated administration of inter-
provincial irrigation systems. Terms of 
reference: measurement of waters and drawing-up 
of regulations.9/ 
(iii) Organizations for port administration 
9- Port of Mew York Authority (States of New York N.Y- Port A. 
and New Jersey). Created by the Treaty of 23 
August 1921Purposes: construction and 
administration connected with access to the 
Port of New York (roads, railways, airports, 
grain elevators, lorry and bus terminals, under-
river tunnels, river bridges). Terms of reference: 
the drawing-up of regulations, construction and 
administration. It has juridical personality.10/ 
10. Delaware River Port Authority (States of New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania). Created by the Treaty 
of 14 June 1932, amended in 1952. Purposes: 
administration of the "port district" in all 
aspects relating to facilities of access for 
freight and passengers, and administration of 
river bridges. Terms of reference: construction, 
administration, drawing-up of regulations, 
expropriation and fixing of tariffs for its 
services. It has juridical personality. 11/ 
(iv) Organizations for the administration of 
public parks (recreation) 
11. Palisades Interstate Park Commission 
Tlftates of New York and~New Jersey) • Created 
by the Treaty of 19 August 1937- Purposes: 
administration of an inter-State park- Terms 
of reference: construction, administration and 
drawing-up of regulations. It has juridical 
personality. 12/ 
12. Breaks Interstate Park Commission 
(States of Kentucky and Virginia). Created by 
9/ United States Public Law N° 408 (79th Congress). 
10/42 Stat. 174; Frederick L. Bird, A study of the Port of New York 
Authority, New York, 1949-
11/ 66 Stat. 738 and 747-










the Treaty of 27 July 1954' Purposes; adminis-
tration of an inter-State park- Terms of 
reference: construction, expropriation, adminis-
tration and drawing-up of regulations- It has 
juridical personality. 13/ 
(v) Organizations for the administration of fisheries 
13• Gulf States-Marines Fisheries Commission (States of Gulf States 
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas).. Comm. 
Created by the Treaty of 19 May 1949- Purposes: 
protection, conservation and development of sea and 
fresh-water fisheries. Terns of reference: 
programming and co-ordination. 14/ , 
14* Pacific Marines Fisheries Commission (States Pacific Comm. 
of California, Oregon and Washington) - Created 
by the Treaty of 24 July 1947* Purposes and 
terms of reference similar to those of the Gulf 
States Commission. 15/ 
Atlantic States Marine.Fisheries Commission Atlantic Comm. 
(States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and 
Virginia). Created by the Treaty of 4 May 1942. 
Purposes and terms of reference: similar tó those... 
of the Gulf States Commission and the Pacific '•' 
Commis sion. 16/ 
(vi) Sanitation and anti-water pollution organizations 
16. Interstate Sanitation Commission New York-New 
Jersey-Connecticut (States named). Created by 
the Treaty of 27 August 1935- Purposes: to 
prevent water pollution along the seacoast. 
Terms of reference: drawing-up of,. regulations and 
powers of decision as to execution of ánti-water 
pollution measures. 17/ 
17* Interstate Commission of the Delaware River Delaware Comm. 
Basin (States of Delaware, New York, New Jersey 
Connecticut 
Comm. 
13/ 68 Stat. 571. 
14/ 63 Stat. 70. 
15/ 61 Stat. 419.-
16/ 56 Stat. 267-and 6 4 Stat. 467-






and Pennsylvania). Created in 1936 by 
administrative agreement among the health . 
departments of the States concerned. . Purposes: . 
conservation of water, soil and forests and 
prevention of water pollution. Terms of 
reference: advisory only. 18/ 
1®' Ohio. River Valley Sanitation Commission Ohio Comm. 
(States of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and West 
Virginia). Created by the Treaty of 11 July 
1940. Purposes: prevention of water pollution. 
Terms of reference: drawing-up of regulations for 
sewage systems and industrial uses of water and 
arranging for judicial enforcement action- It 
has juridical personality. 19/ 
19• Interstate Commission of the Potomac River Basin 
(States of Maryland and Virginia and District of 
Columbia). Created by the Treaty of 11 July 1940. 
Purposes: prevention of water pollution in the 
river Potomac. Terms of reference: study and 
advice to Governments. 20/ 
20. New England Interstate Water Pollution Control 
Commission (States of Connecticut, Massachusetts 
suid Rhode Island)- Created by the Treaty of 31 
July 1947* Purposes: to prevent the pollution 
of river and maritime waters. Terms of reference: 
drawing-up of .regulations for projects.that may, 
result in water pollution. It has juridical 
personality. 21/ 
(c) INDIA — ^ 
21. Damodar Valley Corporation (States of Bihar DVC 
and West Bengal and the céntral Government);. 
18/ Shih, op.cit-, Vol-2, p*1015-
19/ 54 Stat. 752. 
20/ United States Congress Public Resolution N° 93 (76th Congress). 
21/ Public Law 292 (80th Congress). 
22/ In this country, there are two Acts referring to the regulation of 
interprovincial waters in general: the River Boards Act N° 49 of 1956 
and the Interstate Water Disputes Act, also of 1956- See Proceedings 
of the regional technical conference on water resources development in 
Asia and the Par East, op.cit., p. 71 and Multiple-purpose river basin 









Created by inter-State agreement approved by 
Act N° 14 of the Indian Parliament on 18 Februaiy 
1948. Purposes: integrated development of the 
multiple uses of the Damoaar river valley 
(irrigation, flood control, municipal supplies, 
hydroelectricity, navigation, sanitation, 
afforestation, erosion and agricultural and 
industrial development). Terms of reference: 
construction, administration and drawing-up of 
regulations. It has juridical p e r s o n a l i t y . 23 / 
Further details are given in the main body of 
this report. 
22. Bhakra Control Board (States of Punjab, Pepsu Bhakra Board 
and Rajastan). Purposes: water development in 
the Bhakra river basin. Terms of reference: 
financial and technical planning and administration. 
No construction. 24/ 
23. Tungabhadra Board (States of Madras, Hyderabad, 
Misora and Antlhra). Purposes: water development 
in the river Tungabhadra. Terms of reference: 
similar to those of.the Bhakra Board. 2 5 / 
24. Hirakud Control Board (the central Government and 
State of Orisa). - Purposes: water development in 
the Hirakud basin.- Terms of reference: it is subject 
to the control and approval of its member Govern-
ments; construction. 2 6 / 
23/ DVC, Eight years of DVC, Calcutta, 1956; K.K. Sinha, op.cit., p. 436; 
Multiple-purpose river basin development , op.cit., and E / C N . U A J R D / 
C0NF.37l-2, p.22-
24/ Multiple-purposeriver basin development, op.cit., p.69; Proceedings 
of the regional technical conference on water resources development in 
Asia and the Far East, op.cit., pp. 49, 432 ¿id"438; -E/CN.11/WRD/C0NF-
3/57-3, P-24-
25/ Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water resources 
development in Asia and the Far East, op.cit., p. 433* 
26/ Multiple -purpose river basin development, op.cit., p. 69; Proceedings 
of the Regional technical conference'on water r¿sources development in 







II. ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE SUBSIDIARY TO OR CREATED BY 
ONE POLITICAL BODY 27/ 
(a) BRAZIL 
25» Comissao do Vale do Sao Francisco 
Created by Federal Act N° 541 of 15 December 
1948» Purposes: integrated development of the 
Sao Francisco valley. Terms of reference: 
programming, construction and co-ordination with 
local Governments. 28/ 
(b) CEYLON 
• Gal Oya Development Board. Created by Act N° 51 Gal Oya Board 
of 1949, reformed by Act N° 40 of 1952. Purposes: 
integrated development of the Gal Oya basin. 
Terms of reference: construction and administration, 
and the exercise in its own area of the functions 
of other specialized agencies- It has juridical 
personality.29/ For more details see the text 
of this report. 
(c) COLOMBIA 
27• Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca• CVC 
Created by federal decree 3110 of 22 October 
1954. Statutes approved by decrée 1829 of 5 
July 1955* Purposes: integrated development 
of the Cauca basin and adjacent lands,- Terms 
of reference: planning, construction, administration, 
expropriation and drawing-up of regulations. It 
has juridical personality in public and private 




•. 'Com- S. Fco 
22/ Only mult i -purpose organizations are listed. 
28/ The ComBanhia_ Hidroeletrica do Sao Francisco, set up by legislative 
decree 8031 of 3 October 1945, which operates in the Sao Francisco 
valley and whose functions should be co-ordinated with those of the 
commission, has not been mentioned in the text since it is a single-
purpose body. 
29/ Gal Oya Development Board, Annual report 1949-50,'Colombo, 1951; 
K.K. Sinha, op.cit., p. 437; E/CN.n/WRD/C0NF.3/L.2, p-29-
30/ CVC-A regional program, Cali, 1956; International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, The autonomous regional Corporation of the Cauca Valley 




(d) UNITED STATES 
28- Tennessee Valley,Authority. Created by Federal 
Act N°""'l7 of 18 May 1933 and subsequently 
amended several times- For further details, see 
the text of this report. 31/ 
29- St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation- Created by 
Federal Wiley-Dondero Act N° 358 of 13 May 
1954- Purposes: construction and administration 
of projects in United States territory, in order 
to open up and operate a seaway from the Great 
Lakes to the Atlantic. Terms of reference: 
construction, operation, drafting of regulations 
and fixing of rates- Hydroelectric development 
is expressly excluded. It is an autonomous 
corporation. 32/ 
(e) PHILIPPINES 
30^Mariklna River Committee» Inter-agency committee 
created by presidential decree. Purposes: hydro-
electricity, irrigation and municipal supply. 
Terms of reference: planning and co-ordination. 33/ 
(f) FRANCE 
31* Compagnie Nationale du Rhone - Authorized by an 
Act of 7 May 1921. Statutes of 11 October 
1932. Enterprise constituted by. various 
governmental and private bodies in the form of a 
private company but vested with certain official 
powers- For further details, see the text of 








¿1/48 Stat. 58; 49 Stat. 1075; 53 Stat.1083; 54 St at. 611. See also David 
Lilienthal, Democracy on the march, Harper & Bros., New York, 1953; 
Gordon Clapp3 The TVA. An approach to the development of a region, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1955; Roscoe Martin, TVAT The 
first twenty years, The University of Alabama and University of 
Tennessee Presses, 1956. 
32/ See the St. Lawrence Seaway Manual, presented by Mr. Wiley, Senate 
Document N° I 6 5 , 83rd Congress, Washington, 1955-
33/ Multiple-purpose river basin development, op.cit., p. 5 2 . 
34/ Compagnie Nationale du Rhone, Récueil des text es constitutjfs, Lyons, 
1951; idem Rapport du Conseil d1administration "a 1TAssembles Genérale, 






Rhone basin for navigation, hydroelectricity 
production and irrigation-
(g) ITALY 
32- Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Created by Act N° Meszog. 
?46 in 1950- Purposes: development and super-
vision of irrigation, flood control, anti-erosion 
measures, roads, railways and agricultural 
industries throughout the south of Italy. 
Autonomous organization-
(h) JAPAN 
33• Hokkaido Development Agency. Created by an 
Act in 1947 to plan, co-ordinate and administer 
projects prepared by other organizations,^/ 
with particular regard to water resources. 
(i) MEXICO 
34* Comisión del Papaloapan. Created by executive 
agreement on 26 February 1947, and ratified by 
Federal Act of 19 December 1951- Purposes: 
projection and construction of flood control, 
irrigation and hydro-electricity works, 
municipal water supplies, communications (rail-
ways, roads and telephones) and urbanization 
of the Papaloapan basin. It has relative 
autonomy as regards property and finances-
35' Comisión del Tepalcatenec. Created by the 
agreement of 14 May 1947, ratified by the same 
Act as in the case of the Comisión Papaloapan 
which it resembles. 
36. Comisión del Rio Fuerte. Created by presidential Com.R.Fuerte 
agreement of 27 June 1951. Similar to the 
Comisión Tepalcatepec. 
37* Comisión del Rio Grijalva. Created by Com.Grijaiva 
presidential agreement on the same date and 






35/ Yoshitake Sasaki, "The present administrative structure for the water 
development and the problems involved therein", Proceedings of the 
regional technical conference on water resources development in Asia 






38* Comisión Hidrológica de la Cuenca del Valle Com-Valle Méx. 
de_México. Created by presidential agreement 
of 13 June 1951* Purposes: to co-ordinate the 
programming undertaken by various other 
organizations, with the participation of 
professionals. Terms of reference: study only. 
(3) PERU 
39' Corporación Peruana del Santa. Created by decree Corp.Santa 
of 4 June"19433 under Act 9577* Purpose: 
integrated development of water and mining 
resources in the Santa basin, including the 
port of Chimbóte- Its structure is that of a. 
private enterprise and it is financed from 
special taxes (Act 10090 of 1944)- further 
details, see the text of this report. 36/ 
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